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ABSTRACT
The Sign-Up Game, Sophisticated Learning
and Learning Variable Demand. (August 2008)
Megha Weerakoon Watugala, B.S., California Institute of Technology
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. John Van Huyck
This dissertation makes contributions in topics related to mechanism design and learn-
ing in game theoretic environments through three essays. The ﬁrst essay deals with
the question of mechanism design in the principal-agent model. The main contribu-
tion of this essay is in extending the work by Piketty (1993). It prescribes a mechanism
in incomplete informational settings where the principal is able to implement ﬁrst-
best contracts while extracting the entire surplus. Importantly, the mechanism is
such that the desired outcome can be uniquely obtained when agents play the action
that survives iterative elimination of dominated strategies. Furthermore, given the
mechanism, the desired outcome is shown to be a truth-revealing Nash equilibrium
which is also Pareto-eﬃcient. It is shown that the proposed mechanism also has the
feature that none of the agents prefer any of the other possible Nash Equilibria to
the status quo. It thus gives insights into possible mechanisms in ﬁnite agent settings
that could improve upon the traditional second-best results.
In the second essay, a model of sophisticated learning is developed where it
assumes that a fraction of the population is sophisticated while the rest are adaptive
iv
learners. Sophisticated learners in the model try to maximize their cumulative payoﬀ
in the entire length of the repeated game and are aware of the way adaptive learners
learn. Sophisticated learning contrasts other models of learning which typically tend
to maximize the payoﬀ for the next period by extrapolating the history of play.
The sophisticated learning model is estimated on data of experiments on repeated
coordination games where it provides evidence of such learning behavior.
The third essay deals with the optimal pricing policy for a ﬁrm in an oligopoly
that is uncertain about the demand it faces. The demand facing the oligopoly, which
can be learned through their pricing policy, changes over time in a Markovian fashion.
It also deduces the conditions in which learning (experimentation) is not achievable
and outlines the diﬀerent learning policies that are possible in other settings. The
model combines the monopoly learning literature with that of the literature on pric-
ing behavior of ﬁrms over business cycles. The model has interesting insights on
the pricing behavior over business cycles. It predicts that prices jump as the belief
of a possible future boom rises over a certain threshold. The model also predicts
competition to be quite vigorous following a boom while ﬁrms are predicted not to
experiment with their (pricing) policies for many periods following a bust.
vTo my parents
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Over the last century, the theory of games has become an important aspect of eco-
nomic thought. A game is a situation where there is strategic interaction between
individuals. That is, the payoﬀ (outcome) to an agent is dependent not only on his
own action, but also on the action of the agents interacting with him. Game Theory
studies interactions in such settings. Almost all social interactions in our everyday
life exhibit strategic interdependence and, hence, have an aspect of a game in them.
This explains why Game Theory has had such a large inﬂuence on economic reasoning
and social science.
The interactions between a taxpayer and the government, an employee and the
employer, and a customer and a monopolist, all exhibit strategic interdependence.
The actions of agents in these types of situations are inﬂuenced by the rules set at
the outset. These types of scenarios are studied extensively in mechanism design. Un-
derstanding how rules, laws, contracts, etc. inﬂuence outcomes is the key to successful
institution and policy design.
The second chapter uses a mechanism design approach to investigate the alloca-
tion rule a monopolist should enforce among his buyers, given limited information on
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Journal of Economic Theory.
2his customers' demand characteristics. The classical solution to this sort of principal-
agent problem where a single principal is facing a single agent drawn randomly from
an underlying characteristics distribution, shows that the best the principal can do
is end up implementing second-best outcomes. Piketty (JET 1993) shows that in
the principal-agent problem with a ﬁnite agent population, if the agent population's
underlying characteristics distribution is known, a mechanism can in fact be designed
to implement ﬁrst-best allocations. The research of the second chapter ﬁnds and
characterizes other incomplete informational settings, where the principal still ends
up implementing ﬁrst-best contracts while extracting the entire surplus.
The third chapter investigates sophisticated learning. Experiments show that
sometimes these models cannot explain human behavior. For example, experiments
done on behavior on repeated games show that subjects do not initially play an equi-
librium and that play evolves with experience (see Van Huyck, Cook & Battalio 1997).
Such adaptive behavior is modeled by learning. Most learning models (reinforcement
and belief learning) use the history of play to deduce possible future actions even in
ﬁnitely repeated games. Indeed, backward induction and subgame perfect equilibria,
both predict that players would take action in the present only in contemplating the
future dynamics of the repeated game. Such players in the learning literature would
be sophisticated players.
The third chapter ﬁnds evidence for sophisticated learning in repeated coordi-
nation games. The learning model used assumes that a fraction of the population is
3adaptive, while the rest are sophisticated. Sophisticated learners in the model would
be aware of the way adaptive learners learn, and behave with the intention of max-
imizing their payoﬀ in the entire length of the repeated game. The model explains
many behavior such as teaching and signaling regularly found in experiments with
repeated games. The data for estimation was obtained from experiments conducted
at the Economic Research Laboratory at Texas A&M University (Van Huyck, Cook
& Battalio 1997). The analysis reported in the third chapter ﬁnd some evidence of
sophisticated learning.
The fourth chapter develops a model of learning in an duopoly setting. Firms
must learn stochastic demand, while interacting with another ﬁrm. The duopolist
must learn demand through their pricing policy. Demand evolves as a Markovian
stochastic process. The chapter ﬁnds the pricing policy in a grim-trigger strategy
setting and analyzes its properties. The model arbitrages the monopoly demand
learning literature with the oligopoly pricing literature. The model has interesting
insights on pricing behavior over business cycles. It predicts that prices jump when the
belief of a possible future boom crosses a certain threshold. This behavior is similar
to that of a monopoly. It also predicts competition to be quite vigorous following
a boom, while ﬁrms are predicted not to experiment with their pricing policies for
many periods following a bust, which contrasts predicted behavior of a monopoly.
The need for the duopolists to learn about demand changes the duopolists pricing
behavior in the existing literature.
4CHAPTER II
IMPLEMENTING FIRST-BEST ALLOCATIONS IN THE PRINCIPAL-AGENTS
MODEL
A. Introduction
This chapter deals with the problem of adverse selection in the principal-agent model.
In the principal-agent problem, the principal is assumed only to know the distribution,
F(θ), of skills or tastes, θ, of the population. The problem boils down to the principal
constructing a sorting mechanism, given his information about the agents, to extract
as much rent as possible. For the simplest case, when the principal is dealing with one
agent, incomplete information on the part of the principal results in the well known
second-best contracts. Extensive work has been done to deduce conditions under
which we could improve on second-best allocations when many agents are involved.
Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1981) show with a continuum of agents, that if
characteristics of each agent are drawn independently from the same initial distribu-
tion, then the principal cannot improve on the classical contract schedules. Dierker
and Haller (1990) give the counterpart of this result in large ﬁnite economies which
is based on the same independence assumption.
In the case where the number of agents is ﬁnite, there are two common inter-
5pretations of the information (about the distribution F(θ)) available to the principal.
They are:
1. Each agent is drawn randomly from the underlying distribution F(θ).
2. F(θ) is the true realized distribution of the agent population in question.1
The latter is the more traditional interpretation.2 Piketty (1993) shows that when the
number of agents is ﬁnite, under the second interpretation, the principal can design
a game whose unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (through iterative elimination of
strictly dominated strategies) yields ﬁrst-best allocations. Thus, there is no loss
in eﬃciency and the principal is able to extract all the rent. The fact that the
principal obtains the same rent as under the complete information setting makes
this an interesting result. However, the principal under the second interpretation,
in some sense, has more information than the ﬁrst under interpretation. In the ﬁrst
interpretation, since each agent is randomly drawn from the underlying distribution,
the principal has less information on the realized distribution of the agent population's
types. Indeed, in such a setting, it is possible for all the agents to be of the same
type. Such a setting being too broad, Piketty (1993) went to the other extreme
where the principal is completely aware of the realized type distribution of the agents
1That is, the principal knows how many agents of each type there are in the population
with certainty.
2See Maskin and Riley (1984).
6in question. Here, the principal is aware of the number of agents of each possible type
with certainty.
Thus, depending on the information available to the principal, contrasting al-
locations result. If the agent types are drawn randomly from the distribution the
principal is aware of, then second-best allocations can result. On the other hand, if
the principal is aware of the number of agents of each type in the ﬁnite agent pop-
ulation, he can design a mechanism (a game) which results in ﬁrst-best allocations.
Given such solutions, what will happen to the allocations in other information set-
tings? Are there any other incomplete information settings where the principal can
design a mechanism to end up allocating ﬁrst-best outcomes?
Riordan and Sappington (1988) and Cremer and McLean (1985, 1988) derive
conditions on the incomplete information structure in a ﬁnite population in which
full extraction of surplus is possible. All these work assume that agents are risk
neutral. The results of Riordan and Sappington (1988) hinges on a public signal
received after signing the contracts that is correlated with the private information
of the agents. Riordan and Sappington derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions of
the public ex post signal for ﬁrst-best outcomes to result. The result of Cremer and
McLean (1985, 1988) hinges on the principal's ability construct lotteries which the
agents have to accept when participating. Due to the presence of the lottery, agents
maximize their expected payoﬀ and it is quite possible for some of them to end up
with a lower payoﬀ than if they had not dealt with the principal (status quo) at all.
7This chapter deduces other incomplete information settings where the principal
is still able to design a game to implement ﬁrst-best allocations while extracting all
the rent. The main feature of the information setting is that by an agent's revelation
of his type, the principal is able to better deduce the types of the remaining agents. It
also uses the fact that a self-interested agent has no concern for the information of the
other agents he reveals through his actions. Thus, manipulating this non-cooperative
behavior of the agents, the principal is able to design a game in certain settings where
agents would truthfully reveal themselves to obtain the desired results. Also, unlike
the results of Cremer and McLean, agents in the mechanisms proposed are guaranteed
to, ex post, prefer the truthful revealing outcome to the status quo.
B. The Model
Adverse selection in the principal-agent model is applicable to many situations3 and
we will illustrate our result through a simple application of a monopoly (the principal)
selling a single good to many buyers (the agents).4 The proﬁt maximizing monopoly
is assumed to be able to produce the good at a constant marginal cost of c and will
3Price discrimination with quantity discounts (Goldman, Leland and Sibley (1984),
Roberts (1979), Spence (1977), Maskin and Riley (1984)), monopoly pricing of goods
of diﬀering quality (Mussa and Rosen (1978)), optimal income taxation (Mirrlees
(1971)), monopoly pricing of insurance (Stiglitz (1997)) and labor contracts (Hart
(1983)).
4The description of the problem is motivated by the problem in Monopoly with in-
complete information of Maskin and Riley (1984).
8discriminate among the agents by oﬀering them non-linearly priced bundles of the
good.
1. The Agents
The economy consists of the principal (monopoly) selling a good to a set of agents
(buyers)5 I = {1, ..., n}. The ﬁnite set Θ = {θ1, ..., θr} capture the characteristics
(types) of the agents (w.l.o.g. let us assume that 0 < θ1 < ... < θr).
The utility of agent i ∈ I, of type θ(i), is given by
U ((q, T ) , θ(i)) =
∫ q
0
p (x, θ(i)) dx− T (2.1)
where q is the quantity of the good purchased while T is the payment (transfer
paid) to the monopolist. Viewing p (q, θ) to be an agent's inverse demand for the
good, the utility function thus takes the form of consumer surplus. Throughout we
will assume the standard assumptions on U (.) and p (.) as listed below so that the
functions are well-behaved for the problem at hand.
5The words principal and monopoly and the words agents and buyers and the words
contract and bundle will be used interchangeably for the rest of this chapter.
9Assumptions
1. For all θ ∈ Θ the demand price function p (q, θ) is decreasing in q for q ≤ qfb(θ)(
dp(q,θ)
dq
≤ 0
)
and p (q, θ) ≥ c iﬀ q ≤ qfb(θ).
2. p (q, θ) is strictly increasing in θ
(
dp(q,θ)
dθ
> 0, or equivalently dU((q,T ),θ)
dθ
> 0
)
for
all θ ∈ Θ.
The ﬁrst assumption says that for all agents, the marginal utility of an additional
good is non-increasing in the quantity of goods already purchased. Also it claims
that there are always possible gains from trade to be had and that there exist a
unique ﬁrst-best quantity to be traded with each agent. The second assumption says
that agents of higher types are associated with higher demand. These conditions and
the way utility function has been set up imply that the slope of an agent's indiﬀerence
curve is
−∂U
∂q
/
∂U
∂T
= p (q, θ) . (2.2)
Thus, for any bundle (q, T ), the indiﬀerence curve for a buyer of a higher type has
a higher slope. This is the Spence-Mirrlees condition or the Single Crossing Condition.
Also note that U ((0, 0) , θ) = 0 which imply that staying out is normalized to the
(0, 0) bundle.
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2. The Principal
The principal's objective is to maximize the proﬁts made by selling the non-linearly
priced bundles to the agents.
i.e.
max
(qi,Ti),i∈I
Π =
n∑
i=1
Ti − c
n∑
i=1
qi (2.3)
a. The Incomplete Information Setting
The principal is not aware of the possible characteristics of an individual agent but
would have information on the realizable distribution F (θ) of characteristics in the
population. Let F (θ), also denoted by (µ(θ1), ..., µ(θr)), represent a possible realizable
distribution of the agent characteristics, where µ(θs) is the fraction of agents whose
characteristic is θs in the c.d.f. F (θ). Let the principal's knowledge of the actual
distribution (or the sample distribution) of characteristics of the population F (θ) be,
that it is going to be one from the set of possible distributions {F1(θ), ..., Fk(θ)}. This
will be common knowledge6. Thus, if the realized type distribution of the population
is Fa(θ) = (µa(θ1), ..., µa(θr)) then µa(θ1) fraction of individuals of the population are
of type θ1, µa(θ2) fraction of type θ2 and so on.
6Thus, the agents are aware of the principal's information. For the settings considered
here, results would hold even if the agents were fully aware of each agent's type. In
such a case, the only requirement is that the principal have the realized distribution.
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In Piketty (1993), this set of possible type distributions would be a singleton.
Also, if the agents were drawn randomly from some initial distribution, G(θ), the set
of possible distributions, {F1(θ), ..., Fk(θ)}, would be all possible type distributions
that could be realized from drawing agents from the initial distribution G(θ).
b. The New Incomplete Information Setting (NIIS)
Let the New Incomplete Information Setting (NIIS) be such that in the set of real-
izable type distributions {F1(θ), ..., Fk(θ)}, no two distributions ﬁrst order stochasti-
cally dominate the other.
i.e.
@ two distinct distributions Fa(θ), Fb(θ) ∈ {F1(θ), ..., Fk(θ)}
where Fa(θs) ≥ Fb(θs) for all θs ∈ Θ.
This chapter will design a mechanism (a game) where ﬁrst-best allocations will
result in the above setting while the principal extracts all the possible surplus. In
the NIIS, the principal has less information than if he had known the realized sample
distribution with certainty. However, in the NIIS, the principal has more information
than if the agents were randomly drawn from some distribution. The NIIS can be
viewed as a case where the agents are drawn from some distribution where certain
realizable type proﬁles have been ruled out until the above criterion is met.
12
3. The Mechanism and Implementation
The timing of the sequence of events is shown in Figure 1 is similar to that of the
standard principal-agent model.
Fig. 1. Timing of Events
The principal moves ﬁrst. The principal lists r (= |Θ|) possible contracts, conve-
niently indexed θ1, ..., θr, for the agents to sign up for. The principal also announces
the contract implementation rule that is dependent on the ﬁnal sign up distribution
of the population. The principal would intends contract θs for agents of type θs.
Next is the agent's move. Each agent signs up for a contract. This act can be
viewed as a message sent or as a type revelation by the agents. Let mi represent the
contract signed up for (or type revealed/the message sent) by agent i. Therefore, m ∈
(m1, ...,mn) ∈ M ≡ [Θ ∪ {0}]n is the sign up proﬁle of the agents. This proﬁle will
thus determine the resulting contracts according to the announced implementation
13
rule. Thus, the contract implementation rule announced by the principal would be
some function h : M → Z where Z is a set of proﬁles of bundles (q, T ) for all agents.
Let mi = 0 correspond to opting to stay out. If the agent opts to stay out, the
principal can no longer inﬂuence him. This is the outside option of the agent. Also,
let mtri denote truthful revelation by agent i (i.e. m
tr
i = θ(i) ).
Let hi (mi,m−i) denote the bundle obtained by agent i when his revelation is mi
and the revelations of the others is the vector m−i. Once the agent makes a revelation
mi 6= 0, having opted not to stay out, he must go through with the contract/bundle,
hi (mi,m−i), designated by the mechanism.
Also, let the contract
(
qfb(θs), T
fb(θs)
)
denote the ﬁrst-best bundle for an agent
with the characteristic θs where q
fb(θs) is the ﬁrst-best quantity for the agent (i.e.
p
(
qfb(θs), θs
)
= c) and the payment, T fb(θs) is such that
U
((
qfb(θs), T
fb(θs)
)
, θs
)
= U ((0, 0) , θs) = 0. (2.4)
Thus, the bundle
(
qfb(θs), T
fb(θs)
)
is the perfect-price discriminating bundle a
monopoly with complete information would choose for an agent with the character-
istics θs.
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a. The Sign-Up Game
Let m ∈M be the revealed type proﬁle or the sign up proﬁle of the agents. Let this
sign up proﬁle (distribution) of the population be represented by
P = (P (θ1), ..., P (θr)) where
P (θj) =
# {i ∈ I, s.t. mi = θj}
n
(2.5)
That is, P (θs) is the fraction of the population signing up for (revealing them-
selves as) θs. Let the principal allocate bundle
(
qfb(θs), T
fb(θs)
)
to all agents revealing
(signing up) themselves to be of type θs, if P (θs) = µj(θs) for all θs ∈ Θ for some j
s.t. Fj(θ) ∈ {F1(θ), ..., Fk(θ)}. Otherwise, the principal oﬀers no bundles to all agents
(or in other words oﬀers the bundle (0,0)).
Thus, bundles will only be implemented if the sign up (revelation) proﬁle matches
with one of the possible characteristics proﬁles. And if bundles are ever implemented,
they will be implemented so that each agent revealing themselves to be type θi, will
get the corresponding ﬁrst-best bundle for agent of type θi .
Remark 1: In the Sign-Up Game, by signing up as a type θs, an agent might either
end up getting the bundle
(
qfb(θs), T
fb(θs)
)
or (0, 0).
Thus, the name Sign-Up Game is derived from the fact that agents can be viewed
as signing up for the ﬁrst best bundle θs when they reveal themselves as such and
15
since the game's outcome uses this ﬁnal sign up (revelation) proﬁle of the agents to
determine the ﬁnal outcome.
As mentioned earlier, the set of possible realizable type distributions being a
singleton implies that the principal is aware of the actual realized type distribution
of the agents as with Piketty (1993). In such a setting the Sign-Up Game is similar
to the mechanism in Piketty (1993).
b. The -Sign-Up Game
The -Sign-Up Game is similar to the Sign-Up Game in all aspects except for all  > 0
the principal allocates bundles
(
qfbi , T
fb
i − ′
)
where he was allocating
(
qfbi , T
fb
i
)
in
the Sign-Up Game with
′ = min
[
, min
θs∈Θ−{θr}
U
((
qfb(θs+1), T
fb(θs+1)
)
, θs
)]
(2.6)
Thus, in this setting, agents have an incentive (′ > 0) to obtain their corre-
sponding bundle than to staying out. The restriction of ′ (eqn: 2.6) is to guarantee
that the incentive is not too big so as to make an agent prefer the bundle of a higher
type to staying out. As → 0 this game becomes the Sign-Up Game. As always, the
16
agents will still prefer the bundle of a lower type to his own.
C. Results
Proposition 1: If the principal implements a Sign-Up Game in the NIIS, truth
revealing is a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof If all the agents from a realized distribution Fa(θ) are truth revealing, the
fractions signed up for each bundle, P (θ), will match the fractions of the population
of Fa(θ) and thus the bundles they have signed up for will be implemented in their
ﬁrst-best state.
i.e.
If mi = m
tr
i for all i
hi
(
mtri ,m
tr
−i
)
=
(
qfb(θ(i)), T fb(θ(i))
)
and thus
U
((
qfb(θ(i)), T fb(θ(i))
)
, θ(i)
)
= 0 for all i.
For this not to be a Nash Equilibrium, an agent i ∈ I would ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to,
sign up for some other bundle θj.
i.e. If this is not a Nash Equilibrium,
∃ θj s.t. hi
(
θj,m
tr
−i
) i hi (mtri ,mtr−i) for some i ∈ I.
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We know that for any agent i ∈ I, signing up for a bundle θj such that θj > θ(i),
would always result in the agent getting a non-positive payoﬀ (zero if the bundle is
not implemented and a negative payoﬀ if the bundle is implemented7).
i.e. From Remark 1
For θj > θ(i)
U
(
hi
(
θj,m
tr
−i
)
, θ(i)
) ≤ 0
since

U
((
qfb(θj), T
fb(θj)
)
, θ(i)
)
< 0 if the bundle is implemented
U ((0, 0) , θ(i)) = 0 if not
Thus, it is never beneﬁcial for an agent to reveal himself as a higher type.
Now, we only have to show that for all agents i ∈ I, it is not better to reveal
themselves as θj < θ(i), if everyone else is truthfully revealing themselves.
If an agent i ∈ I is better oﬀ signing up for a bundle θj, (θj < θ(i)), then it must
be the case that this bundle is implemented (since not being implemented would yield
the same payoﬀ of 0).
i.e.
If hi
(
θj,m
tr
−i
) i hi (mtri ,mtr−i) for some agent i ∈ I where θj < θ(i)
⇒ hi
(
θj,m
tr
−i
)
=
(
qfb(θj), T
fb(θj)
)
since U
((
qfb(θj), T
fb(θj)
)
, θ(i)
)
> 0 for θj < θ(i).
7Due to Assumption (ii) of U(.).
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Let this new sign up distribution8 be Fb(θ). If the bundles are being imple-
mented in the Sign-Up Game, this implies that the new sign up (revelation) dis-
tribution, Fb(θ), must be represented by one of the other possible distributions
(Fb(θ) ∈ {F1(θ), ..., Fk(θ)}).
Now let us look at distributions that correspond to Fa(θ) and Fb(θ).
The only diﬀerence is that one agent signing for bundle θ(i) in distribution Fa(θ)
has signed up for bundle θj to yield distribution Fb(θ) where θj < θ(i).
Therefore,
Fa(x) = Fb(x) for x < θj, distributions are identical for options x, x < θj.
Fa(x) < Fb(x) for θj ≤ x < θ(i), an extra agent has signed up for option θj.
Fa(x) = Fb(x) for θ(i) ≤ x, since all options k, k > θ(i) have the same number of
agents signed up
This implies that Fb(θ) stochastically dominate Fa(θ). A contradiction. There-
fore, there is no way an agent can be better oﬀ by not truthful revealing himself if all
the other agents are. Thus, truth revealing is a Nash Equilibrium. 
In this case, since the principal is implementing ﬁrst-best bundles and agents are
truth revealing, the ﬁrst-best outcome is obtained and the principal is extracting the
entire surplus.
8When agent i is revealing himself as type θj while the rest are truthfully revealing.
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Proposition 2: If the principal implements a Sign-Up Game in the NIIS, it is not a
Nash Equilibrium for the population from the realized distribution Fa(θ) to sign up
according to one of the other possible distribution Fb(θ) ∈ {F1(θ), ..., Fk(θ)}.
Proof If the population reveals itself to be of a distribution of Fb(θ), all bundles
will be in their implemented state. We know then that, in this case, for this to be
an equilibrium, all agents of type θs must have to signed up for bundles θj such that
θj ≤ θs,
since U
((
qfb(θj), T
fb(θj)
)
, θs
)
> 0 for θj < θs
and U
((
qfb(θj), T
fb(θj)
)
, θs
)
< 0 for θj > θs.
Therefore, the fraction of bundles θj, s.t. θj ≤ θs available to be signed up in
Fb(θ), must at least accommodate agents of type θj, s.t. θj ≤ θs in Fa(θ), for all
θs ∈ Θ.
i.e. Fb(θs) ≥ Fa(θs) for all θs ∈ Θ, with the relation being strict for some θs since
Fb(θ) and Fa(θ) are diﬀerent distributions.
This implies that Fb(θ) (ﬁrst order) stochastically dominate Fa(θ). A contradic-
tion.
Therefore, it can never be the case that a population from a realized distri-
bution Fa(θ), would be in equilibrium imitating to be of a distribution Fb(θ) ∈
{F1(θ), ..., Fk(θ)}. 
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This implies that in the NIIS, there can be no equilibrium in which agents can do
better than by truth revealing. Once the appropriate Sign-Up Game is announced,
unless there is a redistribution of wealth/payoﬀ among the agents, the agents can not
do better even by colluding among a coalition of them. Thus, the truth revealing
equilibrium is Pareto superior to any other equilibrium.
Remark 2: This means that in the NIIS, if a population is in equilibrium with the
bundles in their implemented state, then it must be the case that the agents have
revealed their types truthfully. This is because bundles will only be implemented if
it corresponds to one of the possible distributions and the above proposition showed
that it is not an equilibrium for any population to have had revealed itself to be
another distribution of the possible realizable distributions {F1(θ), ..., Fk(θ)}. So if
they are in equilibrium with the bundles implemented, it must be the case that they
have revealed their types truthfully.
Remark 3: It follows from Remark 2 that in the NIIS, for the Sign-Up Game, in all
possible Nash Equilibria, the agents' payoﬀ will be the same as the outside option.
This is simply because in the equilibrium when the bundles are implemented, the
principal extracts all the rent from each agent and in equilibria where bundles are
not implemented the agent's payoﬀ is the same as opting to stay out.
Thus, if the principal decides to oﬀer  > 0 for each agent if the bundles are
implemented, then the truth revealing equilibrium Pareto dominates (Pareto superior
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to) all other possible equilibria, since in all other possible equilibria, bundles being
not implemented, agents and the principal get a payoﬀ of 0.
Proposition 3: If the principal implements an -Sign-Up Game, in the NIIS, (two
rounds of) iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies yield the equilibrium
in which all agents truthfully reveal themselves. Thus, ﬁrst-best outcomes result and
as → 0 the principal extracts all the possible surplus.
Proof For all agents i ∈ I , the outside option (staying out) weakly dominates
obtaining a ﬁrst-best bundle designed for a higher type θj, s.t. θj > θ(i). Therefore,
all strategies mi = θj > θ(i) can be eliminated.
In the -Sign-Up Game if all agents are truth revealing, all agents get an ′ > 0.
From Proposition 2 we know that if agents are not truth revealing, for bundles to be
implemented, at least one agent i ∈ I must be revealing (signing up) himself to be of
a higher type (mi = θj > θ(i)) whose possibility we just eliminated.
Thus, the only bundle implementable strategy proﬁle left is the truth revealing
one where agents get non-zero payoﬀ ( > 0), while all other strategies left (mi =
θj < θ(i)) always yield a zero payoﬀ. Therefore, all strategies, mi = θj < θ(i), can be
eliminated in favor of truth revealing through weak dominance. Thus, we arrive at
truth revealing through iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. 
Thus, not only is the truth revealing equilibrium Pareto-superior it is also at-
tainable by two rounds of iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
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Example 1:
Consumers utility function = q(θ − q)− T
Monopolist's marginal cost = 0
Table I. The First-Best Bundles for Agents of Diﬀerent Types (θ),
U((q, T ), θ(i)) = q(θ(i)− q)− T
θ First best qfb T fb
1 (low) 1
2
1
4
2 (mid) 1 1
3 (high) 11
2
21
4
23
Table II. Payoﬀ for Diﬀerent Agents for the Various First-Best Bundles
Bundle ( q, T ) U((q, T ), θi = 1) U((q, T ), θi = 2) U((q, T ), θi = 3)
( 1
2
, 1
4
) 0 1
2
1
( 1, 1 ) -1 0 1
( 11
2
, 21
4
) -3 -11
2
0
Possible Distributions
Let us assume that there are two agents and they will either both be of type θ = 2
or one each from θ = 1 and θ = 3. We can denote this by two distributions, D1 and
D2 as
D1 = (µ1(θ = 1), µ2(θ = 2), µ3(θ = 3)) = (0, 1, 0) and D2 =
(
1
2
, 0, 1
2
)
Each type of agent's ﬁrst-best bundles are presented in Table I while their pay-
oﬀs from obtaining each of these bundles are presented in Table II. Note that the
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characteristics proﬁle of the agents in the two scenarios do not ﬁrst order stochasti-
cally dominates the other. The principal only has this information and will not know
whether the realized state is D1 or D2. Let us assume the principal implements a
−Sign-Up Game here.
Let us look at the -Sign-Up Game that the agents will be playing. That is, the
principal announces that the bundles will be implemented (in their ﬁrst-best state)
only if the fractions signed up for all options correspond to either D1 or D2.
Table III. Case 1: The Sign-Up Game when the Realized State Is D1
Player 2 (mid type) θ = 2
Player 1
(mid type)
θ = 2
Stay
Out
m2 = 1 m2 = 2 m2 = 3
Stay
Out
0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
m1 = 1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
1
2
+ ′,−11
2
+ ′
m1 = 2 0, 0 0, 0 
′, ′ 0, 0
m1 = 3 0, 0 −112 + ′, 12 + ′ 0, 0 0, 0
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Table IV. Case 2: The Sign-Up Game when the Realized State Is D2
Player 2 (high type) θ = 3
Player 1
(low type)
θ = 1
Stay
Out
m2 = 1 m2 = 2 m2 = 3
Stay Out 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
m1 = 1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 
′, ′
m1 = 2 0, 0 0, 0 −1 + ′, 1 + ′ 0, 0
m1 = 3 0, 0 −3 + ′, 1 + ′ 0, 0 0, 0
In the example above, if ′ < 1, one can deduce how the agents could arrive
at the truth revealing equilibrium through iterative elimination of weakly dominated
strategies. However, in this example, when an agent realizes his type, he could ﬁgure
out the other agent's type and thus the realized agent distribution. Therefore, this
is indeed a very special example, but the results hold for any case as long as the
realizable type distributions do not ﬁrst order stochastically dominate each other.
Notice that in the above design, the probability of realizing the state D1 (Table
III) or the state D2 (Table IV) did not matter. This would not be the case with
traditional mechanism design. Traditionally, the principal would need to know the
underlying probability of realizing each of the possible types to go about creating the
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second-best outcomes. However, as long as the realizable type distributions do not
ﬁrst order stochastically dominate another, a Sign-Up Game can be designed. In this
Sign-Up Game, if the agents choose strategies that survive iterative elimination of
weak dominance, ﬁrst-best outcomes result and the principal obtains ﬁrst-best rent.
D. Discussion
The Sign-Up Game oﬀers an avenue to overcome loss of eﬃciency in adverse selection
problems in certain settings. This chapter shows that for the -Sign-Up Game, if the
principal's information is a setting of the NIIS, rational agents choosing strategies
that survive iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies result in a unique
Nash Equilibrium with ﬁrst-best outcomes while the principal extracts all the surplus.
In traditional solutions of adverse selection problems a dominant strategy is avail-
able to the agents. Also, given the contract schedule, the outcome does not depend
on the actions of the other agents in such solutions. However, an agent's ﬁnal payoﬀ
in the Sign-Up Game depends on the actions of other agents. For ﬁrst-best outcomes
to result in the -Sign-Up Game, agents are required to choose strategies that sur-
vive iterative elimination of weak dominance. Therefore, agent's rationality in not
choosing weakly dominated strategies need to be common knowledge. There has
been many discussions in the implementation theory literature on the use of diﬀer-
ent solution concepts: dominant strategy equilibrium (Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite
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(1975)), Nash equilibrium (Maskin (1999)), sophisticated equilibrium (Farquharson
(1969)), undominated Nash equilibrium (Palfrey and Srivastava (1991)) etc. Having
a dominant strategy is ideal since in that case the agent's assumption of other agents'
rationality is not necessary. However, such a condition restricts implementation. The
use of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies to obtain a unique equi-
librium is also suitable since it need only assume that agents do not choose strictly
dominated strategies and assume that other agents also act likewise. This chapter uses
iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies to arrive at the desired outcome.
Thus, agents here need to choose weakly dominant strategies and assume others fol-
low suit. The use of the solution concept of iterative elimination of weakly dominated
strategies is questionable if it could make agents choose a Pareto-inferior equilibrium.
Looking at the Sign-Up Game, one can deduce that the equilibrium thus obtained is
Pareto dominant to any other achievable Nash Equilibrium. Thus, in these Sign-Up
Games, agents face no dilemma in choosing equilibria through strategies that survive
iterative elimination of weakly dominance. Thus, the assumption on agents' behavior
used is not unnecessarily restrictive.
A crucial feature for the success of the Sign-Up Game is the information setting
it is used in. In the appropriate settings, if an agent truthfully reveal his type,
the principal is able to better infer the types of the remaining agents. Thus, each
agent's revelation gives the principal not only information about that particular agent
but also information on other agents. The principal thus uses this fact in designing
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the appropriate Sign-Up Game to manipulate the self-interested, non-cooperative
behavior of the agents.
In this chapter the Sign-Up Game in the NIIS setting does not implement any
contracts when the principal realizes that a single agent has deviated from truthful
revelation. Even in Piketty (1993), the principal could end up extracting less than
second-best rent even when a single agent does not choose his dominant strategy.
Hamilton and Slutsky (2004, 2007) propose a mechanism, in Piketty's setting, where
the principal extracts rent even in oﬀ-equilibrium outcomes, while still extracting
ﬁrst-best rent in the truth-revealing equilibrium. They have observed that the oﬀ-
equilibrium outcomes that would result due to a single 'noise' player are very harsh
both to the principal and the other agents. They try to account for this 'noise' players'
irrational behavior, but in a theoretical setting, assuming rational behavior, such
behavior should be of little concern. Using the directives of Hamilton and Slutsky, it
could be possible to ensure that the principal does extract rent even in oﬀ-equilibrium
outcomes in the NIIS. However, the exercise of this chapter is in showing settings in
which full rent can be extracted in the presence of rational agents.
In Cremer and McLean (1985, 1988), they derive conditions on the incomplete
information structure in a ﬁnite population in which full extraction of surplus is
possible. They assume risk neutral agents and the result hinges on the principal's
ability to construct lotteries which the agents have to accept when participating.
Due do the presence of the lottery, agents maximize their expected payoﬀ and it is
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quite possible for some of them to end up with a lower payoﬀ than if they had not
dealt with the principal (status quo) at all. Also, they require that the agents have
the same information about the agents' types as the principal9. The results of the
current setting is quite diﬀerent. Risk attitudes of agents are irrelevant and agents
in the mechanisms proposed are guaranteed to, ex post, prefer the truthful revealing
outcome to the status quo. Additionally, in the mechanism proposed, agents will
prefer the truth revealing outcome to the status quo regardless of the actions of the
other agents. Therefore, if we assume agents have limited liability, the results of the
proposed mechanism would hold. Also, the results of Cremer and McLean and other
literature dealing with incomplete information depend on the ability of the principal
to attach probabilities to possible outcomes. However, to use the Sign-Up Game
in the NIIS, the principal needs only to know the possible realizable distributions
and does not need to be aware of any probability associated with any of them being
realized. This approach of analyzing incomplete information via possible realizable
states without taking their associated probability into account is indeed a novel one.
What does this say about a population of agents randomly drawn from a distri-
bution? Take a simple example of a population of n agents being randomly drawn
from a distribution, G = (Pr(θ = 1),Pr(θ = 2)) = (p, 1− p). One can easily see that
the possible realizable distributions ﬁrst order stochastically dominate each other.
9In Cremer and McLean, if the principal's information on the agents' types is F (Θ),
then agent i after realizing his type, θi, would have the information F (Θ|θ (i) = θi),
on the other agents.
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Therefore, the Sign-Up Game with the above implementation rule would not be of
use here. In such settings, the question of whether the principal can better his rent
obtained by second-best allocations, through an implementation method in the vein
of the Sign-Up Game is ambiguous.
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CHAPTER III
SOPHISTICATED LEARNING IN REPEATED COORDINATION GAMES
A. Introduction
Life is full of repeated interactions with the same people. Our behavior in such situ-
ations is inﬂuenced by factors such as precedents, conventions, norms and an antici-
pation of future interactions. To understand the dynamics of repeated interactions,
laboratory experiments on an eﬀective way. For example, coordination games have
multiple Nash equilibria. Coordination failure results when subjects do not imple-
ment a payoﬀ-dominant equilibrium in the game. Studies of behavior in coordination
games have enabled us to understand coordination failure.
This chapter investigates sophisticated learning in coordination games. Coordi-
nation games describe many social interactions from behavior on the road to behavior
at home, school or work. It could model productivity in an assembly line to trade
negotiations among national economies. Coordination failure and the resulting eﬃ-
ciency lost is the root of underperformance in many situations. Thus, understanding
how people behave in such situations or how people choose or converge to an equi-
librium is critical for the success and survival of organizations and to better design
mechanisms, institutions and public policy so as to overcome and avoid coordination
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failure.
If the same coordination game is played repeatedly, adaptive learning models
predict that players end up playing an equilibrium strategy. In this chapter, a model of
sophisticated learning is proposed and estimated on data from repeated coordination
game experiments from Van Huyck, Cook and Battalio (1997). The estimations ﬁnd
that a fraction of the population can be classiﬁed as sophisticated. Furthermore, the
model of sophisticated learning has the ability to explain other behaviors observed in
repeated games.
Reinforcement learning and belief learning are the two common forms of learning
studied. In reinforcement learning, (Erev & Roth (1998), Borgers & Sarin (2000)),
the player learns according to the history of his payoﬀs for each of his actions. In
belief learning, as in ﬁctitious play (Brown 1951), players try to learn the behavior of
the opponent in order to best respond to it. Thus, players in these learning models
try to maximize the payoﬀ in the next period according to a learning rule exclusively
based on the history of play.
A drawback of such models is that players are assumed to be myopic, that is, to
not anticipate future interaction. They imply that players are unaware of the inﬂuence
of their current actions on future payoﬀs. Another drawback of these models is the
mutual inconsistencies in players' beliefs about their opponent. For example, if two
players are playing a game repeatedly, and they are both ﬁctitious play learners, their
assessment that the opponent is playing a ﬁxed mixed strategy is incorrect (in most
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cases) since each player's strategy will be a series of best responses and not a ﬁxed
mixed strategy.
The learning behavior analyzed in this chapter allows a fraction of the population
to be sophisticated. Sophisticated learning has been studied before1 in models of
level-k learning (Stahl 2000) and sophisticated EWA learning (Chong, Camerer and
Ho 2006). Thus, the term sophistication has generally been used in instances where
the agent has complex reasoning ability in regard to anticipation, recursive thinking,
better forecasting methods, etc.
Chong, Camerer and Ho (2006) consider a model of learning where a fraction of
the population learns according to self-tuning EWA, and the rest play sophisticatedly.
The sophisticated players assume that a certain fraction of the population are self-
tuning EWA learners, and the rest are sophisticated as themselves and best respond
to this belief taking into consideration the future eﬀects of current play for the rest
of the game.
The model used in this chapter is similar to that of Chong, Camerer and Ho
(2006). As in Chong et al. (2006), a fraction of the population is assumed to follow
the self-tuning EWA learning rule. The self-tuning EWA learning rule is similar to
the EWA learning rule but has one free parameter. The rest of the parameters are
self-tuned according to the dynamics of play. Ho et. al. (2007) show that the self-
1see Selten (1991) and Milgrom and Roberts (1991) . For a review of sophisticated
learning see the chapter on Sophisticated Learning in 'The Theory of Learning in
Games' by Fudenberg and Levine (1998).
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tuning EWA model does as well as the EWA model in predicting behavior in new
games2. In Chong et. al., the sophisticated population assumes the same fraction of
sophisticated players throughout the game. However, if players' behavior is diﬀerent
depending on their type, then players may be able to deduce, with repeated play,
the type of their opponent from the actions they have taken thus far. Thus, a player
could have a more accurate belief about his opponent's type later in the game. Since a
player's chosen action is dependent on the beliefs about his opponent, it is important
that the model capture what the player learns about his opponent's type. In the
model below, the sophisticated population updates their belief about the fraction of
the population who are sophisticated by observing the history of play in a Bayesian
manner.
In this chapter a model of sophisticated learning is ﬁt to data from the continental
divide game (Van Huyck, Cook & Battalio 1997) to test for sophisticated behavior.
It ﬁnds that a fraction of the population can be classiﬁed as sophisticated.
2They also show that self-tuning adds the most economic value, that is, subjects would
have earned more in an experimental session if they had followed the recommendations
of its theory.
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1. Teaching in Coordination Games
Teaching is when a player inﬂuences his opponent to take actions that are beneﬁcial
to either of the players or to the group as a whole. Coordination games are ideal for
testing teaching, because the best response in a coordination game is dependent on
the action of the opponent and if someone is playing with an adaptive learner, he
could, with enough play, inﬂuence his opponent's most attractive action.
There is evidence of such behavior. A fraction of the population trying to drag
the population out of an inferior equilibrium is observed in several experiments on
coordination games, which has been called as teaching or leading behavior. For
example, Brandts and Cooper (2006) observe this in their experiment on minimum-
eﬀort games,
we often observe that a subset of the employees act as leaders, raising their
eﬀort levels following a bonus rate hike and guiding the other employees
to higher eﬀort levels.
This is evidence of teaching. The leaders here correspond to sophisticated players
while the laggards may be adaptive learners. Brandts and Cooper go on further to
say that
The success of this leadership by example depends both on the persistence
of leaders and on whether laggards, employees who do not initially increase
their eﬀort, eventually respond by raising their eﬀorts.
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This is consistent with the idea that the rest of the population are adaptive
learners.
2. Speed of Convergence to Equilibria of Diﬀerent Eﬃciency
Van Huyck, Cook and Battalio (1997) notes that
the resistance to dynamics is most pronounced in the low sessions. Nat-
urally, subjects in a low session are more likely to resist the logic of the
myopic best response and ﬁctitious play dynamics than the subjects in
a high session, since the low sessions are converging to less eﬃcient out-
comes.
This fact suggests that players are acting sophisticatedly, that is, sophisticated
players realize that the faster they converge to the inferior equilibrium the more peri-
ods they will earn the low payoﬀs of the inferior equilibrium. Therefore, attempting
to resist the inevitable convergence might increase the overall payoﬀ of the repeated
game since the payoﬀs obtained while converging to the inferior equilibrium could be
higher than that of the payoﬀ of the inferior equilibrium.
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3. Other Insights of Sophistication
Sophisticated players update their beliefs about the likelihood of their opponents be-
ing sophisticated through the observed actions of their opponents. Thus, the ability
to observe everyone's actions would inﬂuence the observed behavior in a repeated
setting. The ability to observe the groups' actions not only facilitates belief forma-
tion but also helps a sophisticated player to eﬀectively signal his presence to fellow
sophisticated players. In many coordination games experiments, a player's payoﬀ is
dependent on an order statistic of his group (minimum eﬀort games, median games,
etc.). Presumably, even though it is only the order statistic that is required to deter-
mine one's payoﬀ, observing the action proﬁle of all of the opponents would help in
overcoming coordination failure in repeated settings because it helps in belief forma-
tion and as a way to signal sophistication.
Brandts and Cooper (2006) investigate weak-link (minimum eﬀort) games where
they test full-feedback (players observing all the actions of opponents) versus limited
feedback (players observing only the minimum eﬀort of the game). They ﬁnd that
when starting from coordination failure, the use of full feedback improves subjects'
ability to overcome coordination failure. Reinforcement learning certainly can not
explain such a phenomenon. However, this can be easily explained by the fact that
full feedback gives sophisticated players the ability to signal one's intent and presence
while also assisting in teaching the adaptive learners.
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Sophisticated players are aware of their ability to inﬂuence the future dynam-
ics of the game through their current actions. Increasing the number of players in
the population would weaken such ability and could hinder overcoming coordination
failure. This prediction is validated through the results of Van Huyck, Battalio and
Rankin (2007). The design of Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin (2007) varies the order
statistic used in the coordination game's payoﬀ matrix, to either 2 or 4 (second lowest
and fourth lowest), and the group size to either 5 or 7. Lower sized groups, with the
same order statistic, are observed to be more likely to overcome coordination failure.
This would be in accordance with the predictions of a sophisticated model since so-
phisticated players in a smaller group would have comparatively more inﬂuence than
one from a larger group.
If the intention of a sophisticated player is to decrease the eﬀort level it could
be easily accomplished in a minimum eﬀort game. However, in the same game, it
would be harder to increase the level of eﬀort in the group. Thus, if higher eﬀort
levels corresponded to higher payoﬀ equilibria, overcoming coordination failure would
be tougher in games with lower order statistics. Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin
(2007) ﬁnd that groups playing games with high order statistics have a higher chance
of converging to more eﬃcient equilibria.
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B. The Model
We start with some standard notation. There are n players indexed by i (i ∈ {1, ..., n})
playing the game repeatedly for T periods indexed by t (t ∈ {1, ..., T}). The strat-
egy proﬁle of player i, Si ={s1i , ..., smii }, consists of mi discrete choices. Thus,
S = S1 × · · · × Sn is the strategy space of the game and s = {s1, ..., sn} ∈ S is
a strategy combination which consists of n strategies. A strategy combination for all
players except i is represented by s−i = {s1, ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sn} ∈ S−i, which thus
has a cardinality of m−i =
∏n
j=1,j 6=imj. Let s
k
−i denote the k
th vector in S−i and(
sk−i
)
j
denote the strategy of player j in the strategy vector sk−i. Let si (t) denote the
strategy chosen by player i in period t while s−i (t) the strategy vector chosen by the
rest of the players. pii (si, s−i) is the scalar valued payoﬀ function for player i and
thus player i's payoﬀ in period t would be pii (si (t) , s−i (t)).
The model assumes two types of players playing the game. A fraction α of the
population are sophisticated players while the rest are self-tuning EWA learners. Self-
tuning EWA is chosen as the default since it is a hybrid of reinforcement and belief
learning. In self-tuning EWA, most of the parameters are deterministically tuned
by the experience of the players. Unlike EWA with its ﬁxed parameters, self-tuning
EWA has the ability to change with the dynamics of repeated play. Thus, if indeed
players' learning behavior were diﬀerent in the latter stages from the outset of the
game, self-tuning EWA would tune itself to this diﬀerence.
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1. Self-tuning EWA Learners
The self-tuning EWA model is derived from the Experience-Weighted Attraction
(EWA) model of Camerer and Ho (1999). Each player i has a numerical attrac-
tion, Aji (t), for strategy j after updating experience of period t. A logistic stochastic
response function, P ji (t+ 1) =
eλA
j
i
(t)∑mi
k=1 e
λAk
i
(t)
, determines the choice probabilities in
period t+ 1. In the parametric EWA model, the attractions are updated as
Aji (t) =
N (t− 1) · φ · Aji (t− 1) +
[
δ + (1− δ) · I (sji , sj−i (t))] · pii (sji , sj−i (t))
N (t− 1) · φ · (1− κ) + 1
(3.1)
The free parameters of the EWA model that are to be estimated are δ, λ, κ and
φ. However, in the self-tuning EWA model, κ is set to zero and speciﬁc functions
are deﬁned for δ and φ. The parameter φ is replaced by φ (t), the change-detector
function which is deﬁned by
φ (t) = 1− 1
2
Si (t) (3.2)
Here, Si (t) is the surprise index which captures the degree of change of the most
recent observation from the historical average. Thus, its deﬁned by
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Si (t) =
m−i∑
k=1
(
hki (t)− I(sk−i, s−i (t))
)2
(3.3)
Here, hki (t) (=
∑t
τ=1 I(s
k
−i,s−i(t))
t
) is the historical frequencies of choices by other
players. In the self-tuning EWA3, the parameter δ of the EWA model is replaced by
the attention function, δij (t), deﬁned by
δij (t) =

1 if pi(sji , s−i (t)) ≥ pii(t)
0 otherwise
(3.4)
As the choice probabilities could be found through the attractions calculated
this way, the likelihood of observing a particular action proﬁle by a self-tuning EWA
learner could thus be calculated.
2. Sophisticated Learners
A sophisticated learner chooses the action that maximizes his payoﬀ in the repeated
game. With probability α a person in the population is sophisticated. Under rational
expectations, a fraction α of the population is expected to be sophisticated. In a
pool of players, if α = 0, then all players are adaptive learners. If α = 1, and the
3Refer to Ho, Camerer & Chong (2007) for a detailed account of the self-tuning EWA
model.
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sophisticated players are aware of this fact, it will result in a variant of an agent
quantal response equilibrium (AQRE). The sophisticated players are aware that a
fraction of the population is sophisticated as they are. The fact that sophisticated
players take the action in the current period that maximizes the payoﬀ of the entire
repeated game implies that they take into account the eﬀect of their present action
on the future behavior of adaptive learners. Thus, they could become teachers to the
adaptive learners.
Adaptive learners choose the action that maximizes the payoﬀ in the next period.
Since sophisticated players are maximizing the payoﬀ of the entire length of the
repeated game, they need not take the action that maximizes the payoﬀ in the next
period. Sophisticated players take an action so as to inﬂuence the adaptive learners in
the expectation of getting higher payoﬀs in the future. This type of behavior, where
sophisticated players take an action which does not give them the highest payoﬀ in the
next period, but do so to inﬂuence adaptive learners, will be referred to as teaching
behavior. Since teaching does not yield the higher payoﬀ at present, teaching is costly
in the short run. So we will only observe teaching if the sophisticated players think
it is worthwhile in the long run.
If a cohort tends to drift towards a Pareto inferior equilibrium, there might be a
required critical fraction, αcr, which needs to be sophisticated in order to eﬀectively
teach the rest of the population to prevent converging to that inferior equilibrium.
This is so because a small fraction of teachers might not be enough to inﬂuence the
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large adaptive learning population to turn the current trend. Thus, the belief that
a particular sophisticated player has about the fraction of the sophisticated players
in the population plays a big role in his behavior. If sophisticated player i's belief
about the fraction of sophisticated players, αi, is less than this critical fraction, αcr
(αi < αcr), then sophisticated player i might not use a teaching strategy since he
would not believe that there are enough sophisticated players to have a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the adaptive learners' behavior. However, if player i believes there is a
higher fraction of sophisticated players (αi > αcr ), he might use a teaching strategy
since he would believe that there are enough teachers to overcome coordination failure.
The sophisticated players are not aware of the identity of the other sophisticated
players. At the beginning of the game, they are aware that in general a fraction α
of the population is sophisticated. This is the probability the sophisticated players
associate with each player being sophisticated. The sophisticated players update
their belief of the fraction of sophisticated players in the population depending on the
outcomes observed in a Bayesian manner.
Unfortunately, as teaching is costly in the short-run, if a sophisticated player
believed that there were more than enough players to teach adaptive learners, he
might be tempted not to teach and try to free-ride and enjoy the beneﬁts of others
teaching the adaptive learners. If we assume that players start the game with the
same priors, they would be starting with the same beliefs. Therefore, by symmetry,
they should have the same inclination for each action at the outset, and so it cannot
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be the case that a certain sophisticated player realizes that he could free-ride while the
others do not. The likely outcome is that the sophisticated players would choose an
action path that teaches the adaptive learners while making free-riding not worthwhile
for other sophisticated players. It would be a certain equilibrium in sophisticated
players' actions. That is, given the identical action paths of the sophisticated players,
a sophisticated player's best response would be to choose that action path itself.
Let αij (t) be the probability with which sophisticated player i anticipates player
j to be sophisticated at time period t by observing the history of play. Since the model
assumes only two types of players, (1− αij (t)) would be player i's probability that
player j is a self-tuning EWA learner. Let Ht be the history of the game up to time
period t. Let LjSoph (Ht) be the probability (likelihood) of observing the history of play
of player j in history Ht if he was sophisticated. Let L
j
EWA (Ht) be the probability
(likelihood) of observing the sequence of play by player j in history Ht if he was a self-
tuning EWA learner. Since, by assumption, player j has to be either a sophisticated
or a self-tuning EWA learner, player i's belief of player j being sophisticated at time
t, αij (t), will be, by Bayes' rule,
αij (t) =
αLjSoph (Ht)
αLjSoph (Ht) + (1− α)LjEWA (Ht)
(3.5)
Sophisticated players have an attraction to each action depending on their belief
about its expected payoﬀ. Letting Aji (t) denote the attraction player i has for strategy
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j in period t, it is deﬁned by,
Aji (t) =
m−i∑
k=1
P˜−i
(
sk−i, t+ 1
) [
pi
(
sji , s
k
−i
)
+ Vi (t+ 1)
]
. (3.6)
P˜−i
(
sk−i, t+ 1
)
is the probability player i associates with observing sk−i in pe-
riod t + 1, while Vi (t+ 1) is the ex ante value of future payoﬀs the sophisticated
players believes to be attainable at time t given his current strategy choice. Letting
P˜j (sj, t+ 1) be the subjective probability of observing sj by player j in period t+ 1,
we get the relation:
P˜−i
(
sk−i, t+ 1
)
=
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
P˜j
((
sk−i
)
j
, t+ 1
)
. (3.7)
Given that αij (t) is the probability player i associates player with j to be so-
phisticated, let PSoph (sj, t+ 1) and PEWA (sj, t+ 1) be the probability of observing
sj in period t+1 by a sophisticated player and an adaptive learner respectively. Then
P˜j (sj, t+ 1) can be speciﬁed as
P˜j (sj, t+ 1) = αij (t)PSoph (sj, t+ 1) + (1− αij (t))PEWA (sj, t+ 1) (3.8)
Thus, a player can deduce the probability of observing a strategy proﬁle in the popu-
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lation by tracking the probability with which each player is a sophisticated learner or
an adaptive learner. Going back to eqn. 3.6, the term Vi (t+ 1), which represents the
present value of future payoﬀs from the current action, can be speciﬁed recursively as
Vi (t) = max
Jt=
{
s
jt
i ,...,s
jT
i
}
m−i∑
k=1
(
P˜−i
(
sk−i, t
) [
pi
(
sjti , s
k
−i
)
+ Vi (t+ 1 | S (t))
])
. (3.9)
Jt =
{
sjti , s
jt+1
i , ..., s
jT
i
}
is an action sequence from the current period to the end
of the game that is available to the sophisticated player. This is the sequence of actions
the sophisticated player believes would result in him obtaining the highest payoﬀ for
the game. It is the presence of this value function that makes a player sophisticated.
The function enables a player to evaluate the possible beneﬁts of teaching, free-riding,
myopically best responding and so on, given his current beliefs about his opponents.
The attraction to each action computed through the use of the recursive value
function determines sophisticated player i's choice probability according to the logit
rule,
Pi
(
sji , t+ 1
)
=
eλsA
j
i (t)∑mi
k=1 e
λsAki (t)
(3.10)
Given the rules of the sophisticated player's actions the model can now be esti-
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mated through a maximum likelihood procedure. The likelihood L, of observing the
actions of players in the repeated game thus would be
L =
n∏
i=1
[
α
T∏
t=1
PSoph (si (t)) + (1− α)
T∏
t=1
PEWA (si (t))
]
(3.11)
Estimations of the MLE were done using GAUSS with the help of the MAXLIK
procedure. As explained, a sophisticated player contemplates all possible strategy
combinations in future periods however unlikely they maybe. Using combinatorics
one could see that this could mean looking into millions of possibilities each period
for each player depending on the number of periods left and the number of actions
available to the players. To resolve this problem, several assumptions were made so
that a sophisticated player would narrow the possibilities to those that were more
likely to occur without hindering the estimation process4.
C. Data
The data used to ﬁnd evidence of sophisticated learners is from the continental divide
experiments by Van Huyck, Cook & Battalio (1997). Undergraduate economics stu-
dents at Texas A&M University played game G in Table V repeated for 15 periods.
4Refer to the Appendix A for an overview and discussion of these assumptions.
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Each cohort consisted of 7 subjects and there is data available for 8 cohorts.
The stage game G has many interesting features. It has two symmetric equilibria,
one in which all players are choosing action three while the other is when all the
players are choosing action twelve. The equilibrium in which all players are choosing
action 3 yields each player 60 cents each period, while the other equilibrium yields 112
cents each period. Thus, the high action equilibrium Pareto dominates the low action
equilibrium. If players could choose the equilibrium (instead of their action), every
player would choose the high action equilibrium. However, due to risk considerations,
precedents set by initial play, and so on players may be unable to coordinate on the
eﬃcient equilibrium. An interesting feature of game G is that most learning rules
have two basins of attractions. Medians of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} are attracted to the
ineﬃcient equilibrium while medians of {8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14} are attracted to the
eﬃcient equilibrium.
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Table V. Payoﬀ Table of Game G
Median
choice
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 45 49 52 55 56 55 46 −59 −88 −105−117 −127 −135 −142
2 48 53 58 62 65 66 61 −27 −52 −67 −77 −86 −92 −98
3 48 54 60 66 70 74 72 1 −20 −32 −41 −48 −53 −58
4 43 51 58 65 71 77 80 26 8 -2 -9 −14 −19 −22
5 35 44 52 60 69 77 83 46 32 25 19 15 12 10
6 23 33 42 52 62 72 82 62 53 48 43 41 39 38
Your 7 7 18 28 40 51 64 78 75 69 66 64 63 62 62
Pick 8 −13 -1 11 24 37 51 69 83 81 80 80 80 81 82
9 −37 −24 −11 3 18 35 57 88 89 91 92 94 96 98
10 −65 −51 −37 −21 -4 15 40 89 94 98 101 104 107 110
11 −97 −82 −66 −49 −31 -9 20 85 94 100 105 110 114 119
12 −133 −117−100−82 −61 −37 −5 78 91 99 106 112 118 123
13 −173 −156−137−118−96 −69 −33 67 83 94 103 110 117 123
14 −217 −198−179−158−134−105−65 52 72 85 95 104 112 120
D. Results
Results are reported in Table VI. The column 'Sophisticated Learning' reports the
parameter estimates of the sophisticated model, while the 'Self-tuning EWA' column
reports the results when the data is ﬁt assuming that all the players are adaptive
learners. Results indicate evidence in favor of the sophisticated model5. Sixteen
5χ2 (2) = 90 , p-value = 0.00.
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percent of the population are characterized as playing sophisticatedly. The λ of
the groups of players indicate the ability of the players to best respond given their
attractions to each action. The λ of the sophisticated players are signiﬁcantly higher
than that of the adaptive learners indicating that the sophisticated players are better
at choosing their desired action than the adaptive learners.
Table VI. Parameter Estimates Using Van Huyck, Cook & Battalio (1997)
Self-tuning EWA
Sophisticated
Learning
Soph. Learning
w. discounting
λEWA
5.37***
(0.0011)
6.00***
(0.229)
6.24***
(0.000)
α
0.160*
(0.111)
0.341***
(0.0889)
λSoph
15.0***
(2.59)
11.1***
(1.54)
δ
0.720***
(0.0959)
Log
Likelihood
-1357 -1312 -1302
No. of
observations
840 840 840
* 10% signiﬁcance, ** 5% signiﬁcance, ***1% signiﬁcance
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Discounting future payoﬀs is a common practice in economics. The model used
could also be modiﬁed such that in eqn. 3.6, the value function is discounted by
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
Aji (t) =
m−i∑
k=1
P˜−i
(
sk−i, t+ 1
) [
pi
(
sji , s
k
−i
)
+ δVi (t+ 1)
]
. (3.12)
If δ = 0, it would correspond to a ﬁctitious player while δ = 1 would represent
the original model. Any other value of δ, 0 < δ < 1, would represent a sophisticated
player discounting his predicted future payoﬀs in calculating his attractions to each
action. Such a model was estimated and its parameter estimates are reported in the
last column of Table VI. The estimates indicate that the presence of the discounting
factor ﬁts the data better6. δ could indeed be capturing the fact that sophisticated
players discount their predicted future payoﬀs in calculating their attractions.
The λs of the modiﬁed model are consistent with the original sophisticated model.
Another observation is that the λs are consistently higher than in the basic adaptive
learning model. This suggests that there are two types of players evaluating their
attractions to actions diﬀerently7.
6χ2 (1) = 20 , p-value = 0.00.
7If players were (close to) best-responding using diﬀerent rules of ﬁnding attractions
to each action, a correctly speciﬁed model should be able to deduce the fractions of
players using each rule. Also, the λ estimates of such a model would be expected to
be high. If indeed players were using diﬀerent rules, estimating the model using a
representative model would result in low values of λ, since there would be too much
'noise' in the data which would correspond to λ = 0 players.
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E. Discussion
The results provide evidence of sophisticated players. Adding sophistication into the
model increases the number of free parameters to be estimated by two, one being the
fraction of sophisticated players in the population and the other free parameter is the
sophisticated player's precision parameter.
In the game investigated, players are modeled to strategize and teach using the
actions of the stage game. However, depending on the game being played, one can
think of many kinds of complicated, sophisticated strategy combinations or rules
players could learn to play. A nice example of such rule learning is learning to play
tit-for-tat in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Such behavior will require sophis-
tication and the degree of sophistication in such a scenario could be more complicated
than in the model used here.
The fraction of sophisticated players estimated in the population is lower than
the estimates obtained in Chong et. al. (2006). This could be due to several diﬀerent
features of the game used here. The continental divide game was chosen since it had
many actions available to the players, which meant that it is easier to distinguish
sophisticated players from the rest. However, the continental divide game uses the
median as the statistic to determine payoﬀs. It is diﬃcult to inﬂuence the median of
seven choices8. Sophisticated players distinguish themselves when they can inﬂuence
8For example, it is possible that any given player might not be able to make any
inﬂuence at all, as when the choices are { 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 5}.
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other players' actions by inﬂuencing other players' payoﬀs. If a sophisticated player
cannot inﬂuence the median (and/or believes so) his behavior could resemble that
of an adaptive learner. Having somewhat lost that ability it is quite possible that
the behavior of many 'would be sophisticated' players, believing they could not inﬂu-
ence the dynamics in the current setting, would resemble that of adaptive learners.
Therefore, this estimate is an indication of the fraction of the population who still
believed they could eﬀect the trend of the game through their actions even in the
median action game.
Decreasing the number of players in the group increases the inﬂuence a particular
member has on the order statistic of the group, and thus would increase the inﬂuence
of a sophisticated player. It would be interesting to see if it is more likely for players
to reveal their sophistication when the inﬂuence they have is greater.
In the model used, the same degree of sophistication is assumed for all the sophis-
ticated players. Indeed the level of sophistication might vary among each individual
due to factors such as cognitive capacity, experience and a model could be speci-
ﬁed where sophisticated players diﬀer in their level of sophistication similar to that of
(Stahl (2000), Stahl & Wilson (1995)). However, given that the primary objective was
to ﬁnd evidence of sophisticated behavior and given the low estimates of the fraction
of sophisticated players in the population such a diﬀerentiation was not warranted.
Since the model can be extended or reﬁned in many ways, it opens the door for
many further investigations. Possible investigations include deciphering sophisticated
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players beliefs about their fellow opponents beliefs and sophisticated players belief
about their inﬂuence on others behavior in the game. It would also be interesting
to investigate whether sophistication increases with experience and whether certain
experiences increase one's propensity to be sophisticated.
In future studies it would also be important to design experiments in which
the model predicts a marked diﬀerence between sophisticated behavior and adaptive
behavior. This would make studying sophisticated learning much easier.
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CHAPTER IV
LEARNING ABOUT VARIABLE DEMAND IN A DUOPOLY
A. Introduction
This chapter investigates the dynamics involved in a setting where ﬁrms of an oligopoly
have to learn their demand environment while taking into account the competitive
nature of the ﬁrms. It extends the work of Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995), where
they deal with a monopoly that is uncertain about the demand it faces and learns
about the ﬂuctuating demand over time through its pricing experience. The related
literature in monopoly demand learning include the work of Aghion, Bolton, Harris
and Jullien (1991), McLennan (1984), Easley and Kiefer (1988), Balvers and Cosi-
mano (1990, 1993), and Nyarko and Olson (1991). This literature mostly analyze
learning a ﬁxed demand curve and thus the learning process boils down to the initial
uncertainty about it making them similar to the bandit problems studied by Berry
and Fristedt (1985) and Rothschild (1974).
In the model discussed in this chapter, demand is not a constant and it changes
over time in a Markovian fashion as in Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995). The state of
demand changes with time and so the ﬁrms have to devise a strategy to check (learn)
their demand environment and thus the process of learning demand never ceases.
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In the case of a duopoly considered here, the ﬁrms also have to take the strategic
implications of the setting into consideration.
The optimal pricing strategy for oligopolies has been studied extensively. The
impact of varying demand (business cycles) on collusive behavior has been of interest
in industrial organization and macroeconomics. First, largely based on pre-World
War II case studies, it was believed that collusion was more diﬃcult during economic
downturns, a position weakly supported by Suslow (1988) through data from many
case studies. Formal theoretical studies done by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) under
a setting where demand is subject to (observable) i.i.d. shocks imply that it is more
diﬃcult to collude during booms (when the level of demand is high). This is due to
the simple reason that there are more economic proﬁts to be earned from deviating
during a boom than when demand is low, since, in the model, the expected future
proﬁts from punishment (from the grim trigger strategy) is the same regardless of the
level of demand in the period of defection.
Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) extend the ﬂuctuations in demand so that
demand follows a predetermined cycle. From their simulations, they conclude that the
oligopolies have the highest tendency to deviate from collusion when demand is falling
and a lower incentive to deviate when demand is rising. Thus, in the equilibrium
pricing strategy under collusion, given the same level of demand, price would be
higher when demand is rising than when demand is falling. The reason for this
conclusion can be attributed to the fact that there are more economic proﬁts to be
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earned by colluding when demand is rising which increases the incentive to collude
and possible prices that could be sustained. On the other hand, incentive to collude
decreases when demand falls since expected future proﬁts from collusion are now
relatively bleak which imply that prices might have to be shaded to be sustained.
One feature of their demand function is that it is fully deterministic. That is, though
demand is cyclic, ﬁrms are fully aware of the future demand at any given time with
certainty.
This chapter extends both the literature on monopolistic learning by studying the
impact of introducing an additional ﬁrm, and analyzes dynamic models of oligopolies
by introducing an environment where ﬁrms learn the ﬂuctuating demand through
their pricing policy.
B. The Model
The model is an extension of Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995), who considered learning
by a monopoly. The model proposed has two competing ﬁrms in the market: a
duopoly market. By adding another ﬁrm to the setup, ﬁrms have to consider the
pricing policy for learning consumer demand characteristics against the pricing policy
under competition with the other ﬁrm. In the setup, demand can only be learned
through increasing prices. Thus, the desire to learn would drive prices up while
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considerations of possible free-riding and competition would drive prices down. Since
the two factors aﬀect pricing in opposing directions, it is interesting to see what the
equilibrium strategy would be.
The process is an inﬁnitely repeated game where time is discrete, labeled t =
1, 2, .... The demand the duopoly faces varies over time in a Markovian fashion. In
each period the duopoly faces a demand of two-units (normalized to two for conve-
nience) where the buyer's reservation price is dt. At the beginning of the period, the
two ﬁrms, ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2, simultaneously set their prices p1t and p2t. The consumer
will buy his two-units from the ﬁrm quoting the lowest price if it is less than or equal
to his reservation price. If the prices quoted by the two ﬁrms are equal and less than
or equal to the reservation price, the buyer will buy one-unit from each of the two
ﬁrms. Thus, only if min (p1t, p2t) ≤ dt will the two units be sold. If we let Iit be the
number of units sold by ﬁrm i at time t, then the revenue for ﬁrm i at time t will be
Iitpit. The ﬁrm's marginal cost of producing the good is normalized to zero.
The reservation price, dt, is assumed to take two values 1 and D > 1. It follows
a Markov process with transition probabilities1
Prob[dt+1 = 1|dt = D] = Prob[dt+1 = D|dt = 1] = α.
1Also represented in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Transition of Demand States
Here α is assumed to be less than 1
2
which makes it more likely for the next
period's demand to be the same as the current's. Thus, this increases the value of
getting to know the current demand. The ﬁrms have perfect monitoring regarding
pricing and sales of the other ﬁrm, so their beliefs on demand will be the same. If we
let wt denote the probability with which the ﬁrms believe that dt = 1 at time t, it
will evolve as:
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wt+1 =

α if min (p1t, p2t) ∈ (1, D] &
∑
i Iit = 2
1− α if min (p1t, p2t) ∈ (1, D] &
∑
i Iit = 0
(1− α)wt + α (1− wt) if min (p1t, p2t) ≤ 1
Properties of the Markov process
1. The stationary probability of the above Markov process is (1
2
,1
2
). Therefore,
if the process's state is not observed for N consecutive periods, wt+N → 12 .
2. Also, since α < 1
2
, if wt > (<)
1
2
and the process's state is not observed for N
consecutive periods, wt+N > (<)
1
2
.
Firm i's discounted proﬁt is
∑
δtpitIit, where δ < 1 is the discount rate, for a
sequence of prices pit and sales realizations Iit. At the beginning of period t the ﬁrm
knows the history ht = [(p1, I1), ..., (pt−1, It−1)], where pt = (p1t, p2t) and It = (I1t, I2t).
Firm i chooses a pricing policy pit(ht) so as to maximize E[
∑
δtpitIit].
At any time t, the ﬁrms engage in a price competition game. The only equilibrium
of this stage game is for ﬁrms to quote a price of zero (the marginal cost), and this
will result in them obtaining zero proﬁts. However, in repeated play, many equilibria
are attainable. In particular, a grim trigger strategy proﬁle with positive pricing
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(and proﬁts) through tacit collusion is sustainable when deviating results in minmax
payoﬀs of zero (the equilibrium of the stage game).
Claim 1. In repeated play, for δ ≥ δcrit, there exists an equilibrium pricing policy p∗
such that D ≥ p∗it(ht) = p∗(ht) ≥ 1 for all i (therefore Iit = It).
Proof.
2p∗(ht) is the maximum possible proﬁt from deviating at time t. To sustain the
equilibrium, future discounted proﬁts from collusion must be higher than that of the
proﬁts obtained from deviation. So,
2p∗it ≤
∞∑
T=t
δT−tp∗iT IiT ⇒ p∗it ≤
∞∑
T=t+1
δT−tp∗iT IiT
which is satisﬁed for all δ ≥ δcrit since p∗t ≤ D and the right hand side is an
inﬁnite sum with p∗t ≥ 1 for all t.
In the equilibrium pricing policy suggested above, the symmetric pricing imply
that the ﬁrms will sell no units or a maximum of one unit each at any time.
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Claim 2. The optimal policy is characterized by a cutoﬀ belief W .
If wt ≤ W ⇒ D ≥ pt > 1. If wt > W ⇒ pt = 1.
This claim follows from Claim 1 of Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995). The result
implies that if it is optimal to experiment with prices at the current belief of high
demand, then it should also be optimal to price experiment for any belief which has
a higher belief of high demand. Also, if it is not optimal to price experiment at the
current belief of high demand, then it should also be not optimal to price experiment
for any lower belief of high demand.
Therefore, three possible pricing schemes or policies result from W .
W ≤ 1
2
⇒ pt =

1 δ ≥ 1
2
0 otherwise
N =∞
W ≥ (1− α)⇒ pt =

pH wt = 1− α
pL wt = α
N = 0
1
2
< W < (1− α)⇒ pt =

1 W < wt
pH W ≥ wt > α
pL wt = α
0 < N <∞
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In the ﬁrst scheme, for the given D, α and δ, it is never optimal to experiment,
which may be due to two reasons
1. Even for a monopoly, for the given D, α and δ, whenever wt >
1
2
, the future
expected proﬁts from experimentation is less than the future discounted proﬁts from
pricing 1 forever. (Note: wt = 1 − α > 12 when demand is observed to be low in the
previous period. By the second property of the Markov process, if no experimentation
was done for N consecutive periods after wt = 1 − α, it will still be the case that
wt+N >
1
2
).
2. Even if demand is found to be high through experimentation, the ﬁrms cannot
sustain a suﬃciently high price to make experimentation worthwhile.
In the second scheme, D, α and δ are such that it is optimal to experiment
forever. In the third scheme can be easily characterized by N , where
N = argN maxψN s.t. ψN = Pr [dt+N+1 = 1|dt = 1] ≤ W
Standard calculations yield
ψN = Pr [dt+N+1 = 1|dt = 1] =
[
1 + (1− 2α)N+1
]
/2 ≤ W (See Feller, 1968).
Thus, N is the minimum number of periods pricing at 1 (no experimentation)
is to be done after low demand is observed, at which time wt ≤ W , the cut-oﬀ for
experimentation will be achieved. Therefore, after N periods of pricing at 1, the
ﬁrms will charge pH and with that, if demand is found to be high, pL will be charged
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until low demand is observed. After low demand is observed (both at pricing pH or
pL), ﬁrms will start pricing at 1 for N periods and this process will continue. Also,
note that the pricing scheme can be characterized by N , where the ﬁrst two schemes
correspond to the special cases of N = 0 and N =∞ respectively.
1. Solving for pH and pL
For the monopoly case (Rustichini and Wolinsky 1995), pH = pL = D, but in the case
of the duopoly, considerations of the possibility of deviation could lower the optimal
collusive price in the given environment as in Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). pH
and pL are such that it is not optimal for the ﬁrms to deviate at any time.
By Claim 2, since the optimal collusive pricing policy at a given is time is de-
termined by wt, let P (wt) be the price charged by the ﬁrms for belief wt. Let Y be
the expected future discounted proﬁts (at the end of a period) after a price greater
than one was accepted and let Z be the future discounted proﬁts (at the end of a
period) after a price great than one was rejected. Therefore, Z is the expected proﬁts
generated starting with N consecutive periods of quoting the price to be 1, while Y
is the expected proﬁts generated from quoting the price pL in the next period.
Y = δ [(1− α) [P (α) + Y ] + αZ]
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Z =
δ − δN+1
1− δ + δ
N+1ψNZ + δ
N+1 (1− ψN) (P (ψN) + Y )
Claim 3. Given pt ≥ 1 for all t in the optimal pricing policy, the future expected
proﬁts must be greater than or equal to that of an inﬁnite sequence of one-unit sales
priced at 1 for all periods.
Proof. (By contradiction)
If it is not the case, then the ﬁrms would be better oﬀ in the equilibrium where
they price at 1 and get a guaranteed sale and obtain the expected proﬁts of an
inﬁnite sequence of unit sales at price 1, which contradicts that the given was an
optimal policy.
It follows that the ﬁrms would only experiment if in the long run they get at
least as much proﬁts as from pricing at 1 forever.
It follows from Claim 3 that Z ≥ δ
1−δ and (1− α)P (α) ≥ 1. Therefore it can be
seen that Y ≥ Z.
Claim 4. 1 < pL = P (α) = min
[
D, Y + α
1−αZ
]
, pH = P (ψN) = min
[
D, Y + ψN
1−ψNZ
]
At any point, the ﬁrms must have higher expected proﬁts through collusion than
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through deviating for the pricing proﬁle to be sustainable.
Case 1. Condition for ﬁrms not to deviate in periods when pt = P (α) = pL (that
is, after pt−1 > 1 was accepted)
2 (1− α)P (α) ≤ (1− α) (P (α) + Y ) + αZ
⇒ (1− α)P (α) ≤ (1− α)Y + αZ
⇒ P (α) ≤ Y + α
1− αZ
Case 2. Condition for ﬁrms not to deviate in periods when pt = P (ψN) = pH
(that is, the period of experimentation after N periods of pricing at 1)
2 (1− ψN)P (ψN) ≤ (1− ψN) (P (ψN) + Y ) + ψNZ
⇒ (1− ψN)P (ψN) ≤ (1− ψN)Y + ψNZ
⇒ P (ψN) ≤ Y +
ψN
1− ψN Z
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Firms want to maximize expected proﬁts given the above conditions for pH and
pL which is to quote the maximum possible price. Since, for experimentation, it is
required that pH and pL ≤ D at all times, it follows that
1 < pL = P (α) = min
[
D, Y +
α
1− αZ
]
pH = P (ψN) = min
[
D, Y +
ψN
1− ψN Z
]
⇒ 1 < pL ≤ pH ≤ D
Therefore, the possible optimal pricing schemes will be the following.
The ﬁrst scheme is as follows:
W ≤ 1
2
⇒ pt =

1 δ ≥ 1
2
0 otherwise
N =∞
In this scheme, for the given D, α and δ, W is such that experimentation is never
possible since ﬁrms will not be able to collude on a higher price.
The second scheme is as follows:
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W ≥ (1− α)⇒ pt =

min
[
D, Y + ψN
1−ψNZ
]
W ≥ wt = 1− α
min
[
D, Y + α
1−αZ
]
wt = α
N = 0
In this scheme, for the given D, α and δ, W is such that experimentation is
always worthwhile.
The third scheme is as follows:
1
2
< W < (1− α)⇒ pt =

1 W < wt
min
[
D, Y + ψN
1−ψNZ
]
W ≥ wt > α
min
[
D, Y + α
1−αZ
]
wt = α
0 < N <∞
This is the scheme where experimentation ceases for a ﬁnite number of periods
following the observation of a low demand period. Figure 3 contrasts the pricing
policy of such a case with that of a monopoly with the same cut-oﬀ belief W , 1
2
<
W < (1 − α). If low demand was observed in the last period, then wt = 1 − α and
price would be set at one. Since nothing would have been learnt about the state of
demand by pricing at one, wt would tend towards the stationary probability of
1
2
.
Thus, the ﬁrms would continue pricing at one until wt falls below the threshold W .
In the presented ﬁgure, ﬁrms are to price at D (pH) after crossing the threshold. If
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demand was found to be high, the ﬁrms would set a price of pL and would continue
to price at pL as long as high demand is observed. At any point, if low demand is
observed, then in the next period, wt will equal 1 − α and then ﬁrms will switch to
pricing at one.
Fig. 3. A Possible Price Proﬁle for a Duopoly and a Monopoly with the Same Cutoﬀ
W, 1
2
< W < (1− α)
C. Discussion
Observations:
1. When the belief of low demand is high the duopoly is able to collude perfectly
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on pricing low (at 1). The ﬁrms set a low price (at 1) for N consecutive periods
after observing a low demand period just as in the monopoly case. The belief of low
demand being high corresponds to a recession in a business cycle. Therefore, this
suggests that ﬁrms hold oﬀ experimentation for some length of time after observing
a recession.
2. After pricing low (at 1) for a certain number of periods, the belief of low
demand crosses a certain threshold, W . At this point the ﬁrms start to experiment.
There is a sudden jump in the prices charged at this point (after N periods of pricing
at 1), and this price that the duopoly charges might be higher than that would charge
after they ﬁnd demand to be high. That is, in periods with price greater than one,
the possible colluding price weakly increases with the belief in low demand. This
observation is quite startling at ﬁrst. It is due to fears of cheating that the ﬁrms
would not be able to collude on higher prices when the belief of high demand is high.
However, there are many interesting implications of pricing behavior that would come
out of this observation.
This implies that there is a threshold belief in future demand at which ﬁrms
drastically change their pricing proﬁle and experimentation in anticipating a boom
in the business cycle. On realizing a boom however, the ﬁrms vigorously compete.
Therefore, ﬁrms are able to collude perfectly at times when optimal price policy
is to charge p = 1. This is because these are the periods with the lowest proﬁts
from deviation. When charging a price greater than one, the optimal price weakly
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increases with the belief in low demand. This is because these are the periods when
the conditions for deviating from the pricing policy would be binding. Therefore,
when the probability of higher demand is high, the price has to be shaded to decrease
the possible proﬁts from deviation.
These predictions are quite diﬀerent from predictions from the oligopoly pricing
literature. In Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) the results came about because high
demand and low demand was equally likely which made future demand always unre-
lated to the past and current market conditions. Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991)
extend the ﬂuctuations in demand so that demand follows a predetermined cycle.
However, using a predetermined cycle also has drawbacks. Though business cycle
seem to consistently go through booms and busts, their occurrences are not prede-
termined. Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) derive that the oligopolies have the
highest tendency to deviate from collusion when demand is falling and a lower incen-
tive to deviate when demand is rising. This is quite simply due to the predetermined
cycle they are in.
This chapter extends these models by making demand change in a Markovian
fashion and avoids the drawbacks of the business cycle model in previous work on
oligopoly pricing. Therefore, the observations and conclusions drawn should be more
realistic.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY
A. Implementing First-Best Allocations in the Principal-Agents Model
This research extends the work done by Piketty (1993). Piketty shows that when the
number of agents is ﬁnite and the characteristics proﬁle of the population is known,
the principal can design a game whose unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (through
iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies) yields First-Best allocations.
There is no loss in eﬃciency and the principal is able to extract all the rent in this
case. This research proposes the Sign-Up Game which the principal can use in certain
other incomplete information settings (NIIS) to implement ﬁrst-best outcomes while
extracting all the rent.
The Sign-Up Game oﬀers an avenue to overcome loss of eﬃciency in adverse
selection problems in certain settings. This research shows that for the -Sign-Up
Game, if the principal's information is a setting of the NIIS, rational agents choosing
strategies that survive iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies result
in a unique Nash Equilibrium. There are many properties of the Sign-Up Game
which make the result very unique. The unique equilibrium is self-selecting, ex-post
preferred to status quo, independent of risk attitudes, truth-revealing and Pareto
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eﬃcient. The Sign-Up Game and its approach to the principal-agent problem oﬀers
new insight into mechanism design. It opens up the possibility of improving upon
second-best solutions in many ﬁnite principal-agent settings.
B. Sophisticated Learning and Learning Demand
A sophisticated learning model was developed which assumed that a fraction of the
population was adaptive learners. The rest of the population (the sophisticated learn-
ers) was aware of this fact and took these adaptive learners' behavior into account.
Thus, when playing a repeated game the sophisticated learners would in each period
choose a strategy that would maximize their payoﬀ for the entire length of the game.
The sophisticated learning model was tested using the data from the continental
divide game experiments by Van Huyck, Cook & Battalio (1997). When tested against
pure adaptive learning (self-tuning EWA), the results are in favor of sophisticated
learning and 34% of the population was found to be sophisticated learners.
The ﬁnal research investigates the dynamics involved in a setting where ﬁrms of
an oligopoly have to learn their demand environment while taking into account the
competitive nature of the ﬁrms. It extends both the literature on monopolistic learn-
ing by studying the impact of introducing an additional ﬁrm, and analyzes dynamic
models of oligopolies by introducing an environment where ﬁrms learn the ﬂuctuating
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demand through their pricing policy.
The predictions made are quite diﬀerent from predictions from the oligopoly pric-
ing literature (Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991)).
In Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), the results came about because high demand and
low demand was equally likely which made future demand always unrelated to the
past and current market conditions. Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) model de-
mand so that it follows a predetermined cycle. However, using a predetermined cycle
also has its own drawbacks. This research extends these models by making demand
change in a Markovian fashion and avoids the drawbacks of the business cycle models
in previous work on oligopoly pricing. Therefore, the observations and conclusions
drawn are more realistic.
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APPENDIX A
ON MODELING THE SOPHISTICATED PLAYER IN THE CONTINENTAL
DIVIDE GAME
In the continental divide game in Table V, each player has 14 actions. Since
there are 7 players, there are 147 = 105, 413, 504 possible outcomes each period. If
a sophisticated player were to evaluate all possible scenarios at the outset of the
15 periods, there would be (105, 413, 504)15 possible outcomes. After each of the 7
players go through those calculations they would have to re-evaluate (105, 413, 504)14
possible outcome in the next period. To overcome this problem several assumptions
are made that signiﬁcantly reduce the number of possibilities needed to be analyzed.
In making these reductions the attractions to particular actions are used so that only
the very likely outcomes are analyzed.
In the continental divide game, players are only aware of the cohort median. The
sophisticated player needs to be aware of the probabilities of future outcomes. It is
assumed that the sophisticated player is aware of the most likely action(s) of each
player in each period if the player was an adaptive learner1.
Sophisticated players form beliefs about the other players being sophisticated.
The sophisticated players are assumed to be aware of the number of players who are
1It is as if the sophisticated player is tracking the attractions of an adaptive learner
through the medians that have materialized thus far in the game and that he is
assuming the adaptive learner chooses the action with the highest attraction (λ =∞).
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more likely to be sophisticated (That is, # {j|αj > 0.5}), and sophisticated players
would believe that these many players would be acting as sophisticated players. Each
sophisticated player would assume that their beliefs are the same as the other so-
phisticated players. This makes the attraction calculation of sophisticated players in
eqn. 3.9 much easier since sophisticated players would know that the payoﬀ maximiz-
ing action sequence, Jt =
{
sjti , s
jt+1
i , ..., s
jT
i
}
would be the same for all sophisticated
players.
The likelihood was ﬁrst estimated by making the sophisticated player look one
period into the future, and after its successful estimation, two periods were done and
so on. This was done to ensure that the estimation converged and did so in reasonable
time. The player extrapolates his future earnings based on the payoﬀ he got from
this last period he iterated into. It was observed that the likelihood and parameter
estimates did not change signiﬁcantly beyond three periods of iteration into the fu-
ture. This could be due to the fact that sophisticated players only looked so far into
the future due to their cognitive capabilities or due to some kind of future payoﬀ dis-
counting that made payoﬀs more than three periods into the future not as attractive.
Another explanation is that the extrapolating technique itself gave a good estimate
of his future earning that would have been obtained in the full iterative procedure.
An additional period of reasoning into the future period means that each sophisti-
cated player, in each period of the repeated game, has to consider all possible action
sequences of additional length while also taking into account all possible action se-
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quences of his opponents for an additional period. Thus, the estimation time increases
exponentially (with a large base) with the increase in the number of periods iterated
into. Since the likelihood and parameter estimates were not observed to change after
iterating for more than three periods into the future, the iteration for three periods
was used, and is reported here. Thus, in the reported estimates sophisticated players
maximize their payoﬀ by calculating their payoﬀ through an action sequence for the
next three periods.
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Following is the code used to find the maximum likelihood of observing the data 
assuming that all the players are self-tuning EWA learners. 
 
/*  Author : Megha W. Watugala 
Version : 4 
Maximum likelihood estimation for self-tuning EWA 
using the continental divide game */ 
new; 
library maxlik;  
SFile = "P:/gauss/datalongd.txt"; 
load data[840,6]=^SFile; 
num_sessions = 8; 
// periods in each session / 
periods_session = {15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15}; 
// subjects in each session / 
subjects_session = {7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7};  
 
// number of actions available to the subjects  
// assume actions are indexed 1 .. actions 
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actions = 14; 
game_matrix =  
{45   49  52  55  56 55 46 -59 -88 -105 -117 -127 -135 -142, 
 48   53  58  62  65  66  61 -27 -52 -67 -77  -86 -92  -98, 
 48   54   60  66  70  74  72  1 -20 -30 -41  -48 -53 -58, 
 43   51   58  65  71  77  80  26  8  -2  -9  -14 -19 -22, 
 35   44   52  60  69  77  86  46  32  25  19  15  12  10, 
 23   33   42  52  62  72  82  62  53  47  43  41  39  38, 
  7   18   28  40  51  64  78  75  69  66  64  63  62  62, 
-13   -1   11  23  37  51  69  83  81  80  80  80  81  82, 
-37   -24  -11  3  18  35  57  88  89  91  92  94  96  98, 
-65   -51  -37 -21  -4  15  40  89  94  98 101 104 107 110, 
-97   -82  -66 -49 -31  -9   20 85  94 100 105 110 114 119, 
-133 -117 -100  -82 -61 -37  -5 78  91  99 106 112 118 123, 
-173 -156 -137 -118 -96  -69 -33 67 83  94 103 110 117 123, 
-217 -198 -179 -158 -134 -105 -65 52 72 85 95 104 112 120}; 
 
game_matrix = game_matrix/100; 
  
session_index=1; 
period_index=2; 
otheract_index=3; 
choice_index = 5; 
 
total_periods=0; 
 /*maxclr; __row=0; _max_CovPar = 0; _max_algorithm = 2; */ 
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total_subject_periods=0; 
 
k=1; 
do while k <= num_sessions;  
    total_periods = total_periods + periods_session[k]; 
    total_subject_periods = total_subject_periods + 
periods_session[k]*subjects_session[k]; 
    k=k+1; 
endo; 
p = {1.3}; 
 
 
{x1,f,grad,cov,ret}= maxlik(data,0,&selftuning,p);  
 
print "  results  "; 
print " lambda  " x1; 
print "  avg likelihood  "  f; 
print "  cov matrix "  cov; 
 
proc selftuning(p,data); 
/* variables used in likelihood estimation */ 
local ylog,i,j,k,m,attractions,Probase,ave_act,change_act; 
local delta,shi,current_session,current_period; 
local actions_done, temp_actions; 
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local 
predicted_median,temp_prob,likely_action,best_response,periods_a
ction,temp_payoff; 
 
local x; 
//y = p[2]; 
x= exp(p);     // x is lambda 
// attrations at each session,period,subject, action 
attractions = zeros(total_subject_periods,actions);  
// used to track the denominator of the probability calculation 
Probase = zeros(total_subject_periods,1); 
// likelihood of each action taken 
 
ylog = zeros(total_subject_periods,1); 
// average of times a particular action is taken 
ave_act = zeros(total_subject_periods,actions); 
// the change in behavior stored here. ave_act used to calculate 
this 
change_act = zeros(total_subject_periods,1); 
// attention function, whether a particular action needs to be 
reinforced by the payoff it would have got or not 
 
delta = zeros(total_subject_periods,actions); 
// the change-detector function 
shi = zeros(total_subject_periods,1); 
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predicted_median = zeros(total_subject_periods,1); 
likely_action = zeros(total_subject_periods,1); 
best_response = zeros(total_subject_periods,1); 
temp_payoff = zeros(actions,1); 
  
 
current_period = 1; 
current_session = 1; 
// initial attractions counter 
local f; 
// long data 
f={0.3,0.3,0.3,1,2,15,16,7,5,8,5,5,2,4};  
 
// main loop 
k=1; 
 
do while k < total_subject_periods;     // for all subject 
periods 
// in one loop a whole periods data is taken care of 
// the while j loop goes through all the subjects in that period 
of that session 
 
    if data[k,period_index] == 1;  // new session 
        // initialize attractions, etc. 
        current_session = data[k,session_index]; 
  current_period = 1; 
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        actions_done = 
zeros(subjects_session[current_session],1); 
        temp_actions = 
zeros(subjects_session[current_session],1); 
        periods_action = 
zeros(subjects_session[current_session],1); 
        j = 1; 
 
        do while j <= subjects_session[current_session]; // 
setting initial attractions 
            i =1; 
   Probase[k+j-1] = 0;   // the base of the prob of 
an action just making sure it starts at 0 
 
            do while i <= actions; 
       attractions[k+j-1,i]= (1/x)*ln(f[i]./f[5]) + 
20;   // attraction of 5 normalized to 20 
                Probase[k+j-1]=Probase[k+j-
1]+exp(x*attractions[k+j-1,i]); 
         i=i+1; 
           endo; 
 
   i=1; 
   temp_prob =0; 
   do while i <= actions; 
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    temp_prob = temp_prob + 
exp(x*attractions[k+j-1,i])/Probase[k+j-1]; 
    if temp_prob > 0.5; 
     predicted_median[k+j-1]=i; 
     i = actions; 
    endif; 
         i=i+1; 
           endo; 
 
      ylog[k+j-1]= x*attractions[k+j-1,data[k+j-
1,choice_index]] - ln(Probase[k+j-1]); 
 
            likely_action[k+j-1] = maxindc(attractions[k+j-
1,.]'); 
            periods_action[j]=maxindc(attractions[k+j-1,.]'); 
   j = j+1; 
        endo; 
        
        j=1; 
        do while j <= subjects_session[current_session];     
      i=1; 
 
   do while i <= actions; 
                temp_actions = periods_action; 
                temp_actions[j]=i; 
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temp_payoff[i]=game_matrix[i,median(temp_actions)]; 
          i=i+1; 
            endo; 
 
            best_response[k+j-1]=maxindc(temp_payoff); 
  
           j=j+1; 
        endo; 
    endif;   // first period taken care of 
 
        j=1; 
        do while j <= subjects_session[current_session];     
            actions_done[j]=data[k+j-1,choice_index]; // action 
taken by each subject this period 
            if current_period != 1;   // setting up ave_act 
    i =1; 
                do while i <= actions; 
                    ave_act[k+j-1,i] = ((current_period-
1)*ave_act[k+j-subjects_session[current_session]-
1,i])./current_period; 
                    i = i+1; 
                endo; 
            endif; 
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            ave_act[k+j-1,data[k+j-1,choice_index]] = 
ave_act[k+j-1,data[k+j-1,choice_index]]+ 1/current_period; 
            j = j+1;    
        endo; 
 
        j=1; 
 
        do while j <= subjects_session[current_session];  // for 
all subjects in this period deducing their logl 
   m=1; 
 
            do while m <= subjects_session[current_session];  // 
to calculate change in action  
                if m != j; // of opponents 
                    i=1; 
 
                    do while i <= actions; 
                        if i == actions_done[m]; 
                   change_act[k+j-1] = change_act[k+j-1] 
+ ((1-ave_act[k+m-1,i])^2)./(subjects_session[current_session]-
1); 
                        else; 
                   change_act[k+j-1] = change_act[k+j-1] 
+ (ave_act[k+m-1,i]^2)./(subjects_session[current_session]-1); 
                        endif; 
                        i = i+1; 
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                    endo; 
             endif; 
                m = m+1; 
            endo; 
 
            i=1; 
            do while i <= actions;  // calculate attention 
function 
 
                temp_actions = actions_done; 
                temp_actions[j]=i;             
          if game_matrix[i,median(temp_actions)] >= 
game_matrix[data[k+j-1,choice_index],data[k+j-
1,otheract_index]]; 
     delta[k+j-1,i] = 1; 
    else; 
     delta[k+j-1,i] = 0; 
    endif; 
  
               i=i+1; 
         endo; 
 
   shi[k+j-1] = 1-0.5*change_act[k+j-1];   // 
change detector function 
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            shi[k+j-1] = (0.5 + (current_period-1)*shi[k+j-
1])./current_period; // adjustment to better update initially 
 
            if current_period != 
periods_session[current_session];  // unless it is the last 
period 
                Probase[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-1] 
=0; 
 
    i=1; 
                do while i <= actions; 
                    // set the attractions for next period 
                  temp_actions = actions_done;  // actions taken 
this period 
                  temp_actions[j]=i;             
 
                   
attractions[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1,i]=(current_period*shi[k+j-1]*attractions[k+j-1,i]+delta[k+j-
1,i]*(game_matrix[i,median(temp_actions)]))./(current_period*shi
[k+j-1]+1); 
 
                   
Probase[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1]=Probase[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
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1]+exp(x*attractions[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1,i]); 
                   i=i+1; 
                endo; 
 
    i=1; 
    temp_prob =0; 
 
    do while i <= actions; 
 
     temp_prob = temp_prob + 
exp(x*attractions[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1,i])/Probase[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-1]; 
     if temp_prob > 0.5; 
     
 predicted_median[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1]=i; 
      i = actions; 
     endif; 
           i=i+1; 
             endo; 
 
                ylog[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-1]= 
x*attractions[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1,data[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-1,choice_index]] - 
ln(Probase[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-1]); 
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likely_action[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-1] = 
maxindc(attractions[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1,.]'); 
                
periods_action[j]=maxindc(attractions[k+j+subjects_session[curre
nt_session]-1,.]'); 
   endif; 
            j = j+1; 
        endo; 
        if current_period != periods_session[current_session];  
// unless it is the last period 
 
            j=1; 
            do while j <= subjects_session[current_session];     
            i=1; 
       do while i <= actions; 
                    temp_actions = periods_action; 
                    temp_actions[j]=i; 
                    
temp_payoff[i]=game_matrix[i,median(temp_actions)]; 
              i=i+1; 
                endo; 
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best_response[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1]=maxindc(temp_payoff); 
                j=j+1; 
            endo; 
        endif; 
 
    current_period = current_period +1; 
    k = k + subjects_session[current_session]; 
 
endo; 
retp(ylog); 
endp; 
 
proc max(x,y); // procedure to return maximum 
 if x>y; 
  retp(x); 
 else; 
  retp(y); 
 endif; 
endp; 
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APPENDIX C 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION FOR SOPHISTICATED LEARNING 
 
 
Following is the code used to find the maximum likelihood of observing the data 
assuming that a fraction of the players are sophisticated learners while the rest are 
self-tuning EWA learners. 
 
/*  Author : Megha W. Watugala 
Maximum likelihood estimation for Sophisticated Learning  
using the continental divide game */ 
new; 
library maxlik;  
//  long datad set header 
SFile = "P:/gauss/datalongd.txt"; 
load data[840,6]=^SFile; 
num_sessions = 8; 
// periods in each session / 
periods_session = {15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15}; 
// subjects in each session / 
subjects_session = {7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7};  
// 1 if converging to low action and 2 if converging to high 
action  
session_end = {1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2}; 
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session_index=1; 
period_index=2; 
otheract_index=3; 
choice_index = 5; 
// number of actions available to the subjects  
// assume actions are indexed 1 .. actions 
actions = 14; 
//payoff table 
game_matrix =  
{45   49  52  55  56 55 46 -59 -88 -105 -117 -127 -135 -142, 
 48   53  58  62  65  66  61 -27 -52 -67 -77  -86 -92  -98, 
 48   54   60  66  70  74  72  1 -20 -30 -41  -48 -53 -58, 
 43   51   58  65  71  77  80  26  8  -2  -9  -14 -19 -22, 
 35   44   52  60  69  77  86  46  32  25  19  15  12  10, 
 23   33   42  52  62  72  82  62  53  47  43  41  39  38, 
  7   18   28  40  51  64  78  75  69  66  64  63  62  62, 
-13   -1   11  23  37  51  69  83  81  80  80  80  81  82, 
-37   -24  -11  3  18  35  57  88  89  91  92  94  96  98, 
-65   -51  -37 -21  -4  15  40  89  94  98 101 104 107 110, 
-97   -82  -66 -49 -31  -9   20 85  94 100 105 110 114 119, 
-133 -117 -100  -82 -61 -37  -5 78  91  99 106 112 118 123, 
-173 -156 -137 -118 -96  -69 -33 67 83  94 103 110 117 123, 
-217 -198 -179 -158 -134 -105 -65 52 72 85 95 104 112 120}; 
// convert to dollar amounts 
 print " lambda  " x1; 
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game_matrix = game_matrix/100; 
 
total_periods=0; 
total_subject_periods=0; 
k=1; 
do while k <= num_sessions;  
    total_periods = total_periods + periods_session[k]; 
    total_subject_periods = total_subject_periods + 
periods_session[k]*subjects_session[k]; 
    k=k+1; 
endo; 
p = {1,0,0,1}; 
/* p is the passed in values of the variable 
x1 the values of the variable at maximum likelihood */ 
/*maxclr; __row=0; _max_CovPar = 0; _max_algorithm = 2; */ 
 _max_MaxIters =15; 
{x1,f,grad,cov,ret}= maxlik(data,0,&selftuning,p);  
print "  results  "; 
print "  avg likelihood  "  f; 
print "  cov matrix "  cov; 
end; 
proc selftuning(p,data); 
/* variables used in likelihood estimation */ 
 101
local 
ylog,yylog,yy,i,j,k,m,attractions,Probase,ave_act,change_act; 
local delta,shi,current_session,current_period; 
local actions_done, temp_actions; 
local 
predicted_median,temp_prob,likely_action,best_response,periods_a
ction,temp_payoff; 
local r, Vmax, Vtemp, alphabar, attractions_block, 
ave_act_block; 
local x,y,alpha,randnum,selflog,sophlog,ifsoph; 
 
x= exp(p[1]);     // x is lambda for selftuning EWA 
y=exp(p[4]);    // y is lambda for sophisticated players 
alphabar = exp(p[2])/(1+exp(p[2])); 
alpha = exp(p[3])/(1+exp(p[3])); 
 
local numsoph; 
local x1,fm,grad,cov,ret,alphatable,logtable,templogtable;  
 
logtable = 
zeros(maxc(periods_session),2*maxc(subjects_session)); 
 
alphatable = zeros(maxc(subjects_session),1); 
 
// attrations at each session,period,subject, action 
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attractions = zeros(total_subject_periods,actions);  
// used to track the denominator of the probability calculation 
Probase = zeros(total_subject_periods,1); 
// likelihood of each action taken 
ylog = zeros(total_subject_periods,1); 
// average of times a particular action is taken 
ave_act = zeros(total_subject_periods,actions); 
// the change in behavior stored here. ave_act used to calculate 
this 
change_act = zeros(total_subject_periods,1); 
// attention function, whether a particular action needs to be 
reinforced by the payoff it would have got or not 
delta = zeros(total_subject_periods,actions); 
// the change-detector function 
shi = zeros(total_subject_periods,1); 
predicted_median = zeros(total_subject_periods,1); 
likely_action = zeros(total_subject_periods,1); 
best_response = zeros(total_subject_periods,1); 
temp_payoff = zeros(actions,1); 
  
current_period = 1; 
current_session = 1; 
 
// initial attractions counter 
local f; 
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// long data 
//f={0.1,0.1,0.1,1,4,16,18,7,6,9,6,6,2,5};  
f={0.3,0.3,0.3,1,2,15,16,7,5,8,5,5,2,4};  
// f is set according to players behavior in the first period 
 
// main loop 
k=1; 
do while k < total_subject_periods;     // for all subject 
periods 
// in one loop a whole periods data is taken care of 
// the while j loop goes through all the subjects in that period 
of that session 
    if data[k,period_index] == 1;  // new session 
 
      // initialize attractions, etc. 
      current_session = data[k,session_index]; 
  current_period = 1; 
      actions_done = zeros(subjects_session[current_session],1); 
      temp_actions = zeros(subjects_session[current_session],1); 
      periods_action = 
zeros(subjects_session[current_session],1); 
      selflog = zeros(subjects_session[current_session],1); 
      sophlog = zeros(subjects_session[current_session],1); 
      ifsoph = zeros(subjects_session[current_session],1); 
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      attractions_block = 
zeros(subjects_session[current_session],actions); 
      ave_act_block = 
zeros(subjects_session[current_session],actions); 
       
      logtable = 
zeros(maxc(periods_session),2*maxc(subjects_session)); 
      templogtable = zeros(maxc(periods_session),2); 
 
      alphatable = zeros(maxc(subjects_session),1); 
 
      j = 1; 
      do while j <= subjects_session[current_session]; // 
setting initial attractions 
          i =1; 
   Probase[k+j-1] = 0;   // the base of the prob of 
an action just making sure it starts at 0 
          do while i <= actions; 
            //attractions_block[j,i] = 
(1/x[session_end[current_session]])*ln(f[i]./f[5]); 
       attractions[k+j-1,i]= (1/x)*ln(f[i]./f[5]);    
 
            Probase[k+j-1]=Probase[k+j-1]+exp(x*attractions[k+j-
1,i]); 
       i=i+1; 
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         endo; 
 
      ylog[k+j-1]= x*attractions[k+j-1,data[k+j-
1,choice_index]] - ln(Probase[k+j-1]); 
          selflog[j] = x*attractions[k+j-1,data[k+j-
1,choice_index]] - ln(Probase[k+j-1]); 
          sophlog[j] = x*attractions[k+j-1,data[k+j-
1,choice_index]] - ln(Probase[k+j-1]); 
          logtable[current_period,2*j-1] = x*attractions[k+j-
1,data[k+j-1,choice_index]] - ln(Probase[k+j-1]); 
          logtable[current_period,2*j] = x*attractions[k+j-
1,data[k+j-1,choice_index]] - ln(Probase[k+j-1]); 
          alphatable[j] = alpha; 
          periods_action[j]=maxindc(attractions[k+j-1,.]'); 
 
   j = j+1; 
      endo; 
 
      j=1; 
      do while j <= subjects_session[current_session];    // 
creating the best_response vector 
      i=1; 
   do while i <= actions; 
            temp_actions = periods_action; 
            temp_actions[j]=i; 
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            temp_payoff[i]=game_matrix[i,median(temp_actions)]; 
        i=i+1; 
          endo; 
          best_response[k+j-1]=maxindc(temp_payoff); 
          j=j+1; 
      endo; 
 
    endif;   // first period taken care of 
 
      j=1; 
      do while j <= subjects_session[current_session];     
          actions_done[j]=data[k+j-1,choice_index]; // action 
taken by each subject this period 
 
          if current_period != 1;   // setting up ave_act 
    i =1; 
            do while i <= actions; 
                ave_act[k+j-1,i] = ((current_period-
1)*ave_act[k+j-subjects_session[current_session]-
1,i])./current_period; 
                ave_act_block[j,i] = ave_act[k+j-1,i]; 
                i = i+1; 
            endo; 
          endif; 
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          ave_act[k+j-1,data[k+j-1,choice_index]] = ave_act[k+j-
1,data[k+j-1,choice_index]]+ 1/current_period; 
          ave_act_block[j,data[k+j-1,choice_index]] = 
ave_act[k+j-1,data[k+j-1,choice_index]]; 
          j = j+1;    
      endo; 
 
      j=1; 
 
      do while j <= subjects_session[current_session];  // for 
all subjects in this period deducing their logl 
   m=1; 
 
          do while m <= subjects_session[current_session];  // 
to calculate change in action  
            if m != j; // of opponents 
                i=1; 
                do while i <= actions; 
                  if i == actions_done[m]; 
               change_act[k+j-1] = change_act[k+j-1] 
+ ((1-ave_act[k+m-1,i])^2)./(subjects_session[current_session]-
1); 
 
                  else; 
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               change_act[k+j-1] = change_act[k+j-1] 
+ (ave_act[k+m-1,i]^2)./(subjects_session[current_session]-1); 
                  endif; 
                  i = i+1; 
                endo; 
           endif; 
            m = m+1; 
          endo; 
 
          i=1; 
          do while i <= actions;  // calculate attention 
function 
            temp_actions = actions_done; 
            temp_actions[j]=i;           
        if game_matrix[i,median(temp_actions)] >= 
game_matrix[data[k+j-1,choice_index],data[k+j-
1,otheract_index]]; 
     delta[k+j-1,i] = 1; 
    else; 
     delta[k+j-1,i] = 0; 
    endif; 
            i=i+1; 
       endo; 
 
   shi[k+j-1] = 1-0.5*change_act[k+j-1];    
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// change detector function 
 
          shi[k+j-1] = (0.5 + (current_period-1)*shi[k+j-
1])./current_period; // adjustment to better update initially 
 
          if current_period != periods_session[current_session];  
// unless it is the last period 
            Probase[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-1] =0; 
    i=1; 
            do while i <= actions; // set attractions 
                // set the attractions for next period 
                temp_actions = actions_done;   
// actions taken this period 
                temp_actions[j]=i;           
                
attractions[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1,i]=(current_period*shi[k+j-1]*attractions[k+j-1,i]+delta[k+j-
1,i]*(game_matrix[i,median(temp_actions)]))./(current_period*shi
[k+j-1]+1); 
 
                attractions_block[j,i] = 
attractions[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-1,i]; 
                Probase[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1]=Probase[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
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1]+exp(x*attractions[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1,i]); 
                i=i+1; 
            endo; 
 
            ylog[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-1]= 
x*attractions[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1,data[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-1,choice_index]] - 
ln(Probase[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-1]); 
 
            
periods_action[j]=maxindc(attractions[k+j+subjects_session[curre
nt_session]-1,.]'); 
   endif; 
          j = j+1; 
      endo; 
 
      if current_period != periods_session[current_session];  // 
unless it is the last period 
          j=1; 
 
          do while j <= subjects_session[current_session];     
            i=1; 
            numsoph = 0; 
            Vmax = zeros(actions,1); 
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       do while i <= actions; 
                temp_actions = periods_action; 
 
                temp_actions[j]=i; 
 
                  m=1; 
                  do while m<=subjects_session[current_session];  
                    if m !=j; 
 
                        if  ifsoph[m] >= 0.5; 
                          temp_actions[m]=i; 
                          numsoph = numsoph +1; 
                        endif; 
 
                    endif; 
                    m=m+1; 
                  endo; 
 
 
 
                
temp_payoff[i]=game_matrix[i,median(temp_actions)]; 
 
                Vmax[i] = temp_payoff[i] + 
alphabar*FVmax(i,temp_actions,alphabar,current_period,min(2,peri
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ods_session[current_session]-current_period-
1),attractions_block,j,subjects_session[current_session],actions
,ave_act_block,p,periods_session[current_session]-
current_period-1,ifsoph); 
 
                i=i+1; 
            endo; 
 
            selflog[j] = selflog[j] + 
ylog[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-1]; 
 
            sophlog[j] = sophlog[j] + 
ln(exp(y*Vmax[data[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1,choice_index]])./sumc(exp(y*Vmax))); 
 
            logtable[current_period+1,2*j-1] = 
ylog[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-1]; 
 
            logtable[current_period+1,2*j] = 
ln(exp(y*Vmax[data[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1,choice_index]])./sumc(exp(y*Vmax))); 
 
            ylog[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-1]= 
ln((1-ifsoph[j])*exp(ylog[k+j+subjects_session[current_session]-
1]) + 
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((ifsoph[j]*exp(y*Vmax[data[k+j+subjects_session[current_session
]-1,choice_index]]))./sumc(exp(y*Vmax)))); 
            j=j+1; 
          endo; 
          j=1; 
          do while j <= subjects_session[current_session];     
            ifsoph[j] = 
exp(sophlog[j])*alpha/(exp(sophlog[j])*alpha+exp(selflog[j])*(1-
alpha)); 
 
            j=j+1; 
          endo; 
      endif; 
 
    current_period = current_period +1; 
    k = k + subjects_session[current_session]; 
endo; 
retp(ylog); 
endp; 
 
proc max(x,y); // procedure to return maximum 
 if x>y; 
  retp(x); 
 else; 
  retp(y); 
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 endif; 
endp; 
 
proc min(x,y); // procedure to return maximum 
 if x>y; 
  retp(y); 
 else; 
  retp(x); 
 endif; 
endp; 
 
// procedure used by the sophisticated players to iterate into 
the future periods 
proc 
FVmax(Jt,periods_act,alphabar,T,Tleft,attracts,player,subjects,a
cts,ave_acts,p,Tleftact,ifsoph); 
/* variables used in FVmax */ 
local r,Vmax,Vtemp,i,j,m,fattractions,fProbase,fchange_act; 
local fdelta,fshi; 
local acts_done, temp_acts; 
local 
fbest_response,periods_acts,ftemp_payoff,randnum,yy,Vmaxyy; 
 
local x,y; 
x= exp(p[1]);     // x is lambda 
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// attrations for each subject for each action 
fattractions = zeros(subjects,acts);  
// used to track the denominator of the probability calculation 
fProbase = zeros(subjects,1); 
// the change in behavior stored here. ave_act used to calculate 
this 
fchange_act = zeros(subjects,1); 
// attention function, whether a particular action needs to be 
reinforced by the payoff it would have got or not 
fdelta = zeros(subjects,acts); 
// the change-detector function 
fshi = zeros(subjects,1); 
 
fbest_response = zeros(subjects,1); 
//randnum = zeros(subjects,1) 
ftemp_payoff = zeros(acts,1); 
acts_done = zeros(subjects,1);  
 
    if Tleft <= 0; 
      Vmax = 0; 
      retp(Vmax); 
    else; 
 
      T = T + 1; 
      j=1; 
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      do while j <= subjects;     
          acts_done[j]=periods_act[j]; // action taken by each 
subject this period 
          i =1; 
            do while i <= acts; 
                ave_acts[j,i] = ((T-1)*ave_acts[j,i])./T; 
                i = i+1; 
            endo; 
          if acts_done[j] >acts; 
            print acts_done; 
          else; 
            ave_acts[j,acts_done[j]] = ave_acts[j,acts_done[j]]+ 
1/T; 
          endif; 
          j = j+1;    
      endo; 
      j=1; 
      do while j <= subjects;  // for all subjects in this 
period deducing their logl 
   m=1; 
          do while m <= subjects;  // to calculate change in 
action  
            if m != j; // of opponents 
                i=1; 
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                do while i <= acts; 
                  if i == acts_done[m]; 
               fchange_act[j] = fchange_act[j] + 
((1-ave_acts[m,i])^2)./(subjects-1); 
                  else; 
               fchange_act[j] = fchange_act[j] + 
(ave_acts[m,i]^2)./(subjects-1); 
                  endif; 
                  //change_act_block[j] = change_act[k+j-1]; 
                  i = i+1; 
                endo; 
           endif; 
            m = m+1; 
          endo; 
          i=1; 
          do while i <= acts;  // calculate attention function 
            temp_acts = acts_done; 
            temp_acts[j]=i;           
        if game_matrix[i,median(temp_acts)] >= 
game_matrix[acts_done[j],median(acts_done)]; 
     fdelta[j,i] = 1; 
    else; 
     fdelta[j,i] = 0; 
    endif; 
            i=i+1; 
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       endo; 
   fshi[j] = 1-0.5*fchange_act[j];   // change 
detector function 
 
          fshi[j] = (0.5 + (T-1)*fshi[j])./T; // adjustment to 
better update initially 
          //if Tleft != 1;  // unless it is the last period 
            fProbase[j] =0; 
    i=1; 
            do while i <= acts; 
                // set the attractions for next period 
              temp_acts = acts_done;  // actions taken this 
period 
              temp_acts[j]=i;           
               
fattractions[j,i]=(T*fshi[j]*attracts[j,i]+fdelta[j,i]*(game_mat
rix[i,median(temp_acts)]))./(T*fshi[j]+1); 
               fProbase[j]=fProbase[j]+exp(x*fattractions[j,i]); 
               i=i+1; 
            endo; 
    periods_act[j]=maxindc(fattractions[j,.]'); 
          j = j+1; 
      endo; 
            j = player; 
             i=1; 
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         do while i <= acts; 
                  //temp_acts = round(periods_act); 
                  temp_acts = periods_act; 
                  temp_acts[j]=i; 
                  
ftemp_payoff[i]=game_matrix[i,median(temp_acts)]; 
            i=i+1; 
                endo; 
                fbest_response[j]=maxindc(ftemp_payoff); 
                r = max(1,fbest_response[j]-1); 
  
               Vmax = 0; 
                if Tleft == 1; 
 
                  //Vmax = (Tleftact-
Tleft+2)*maxc(ftemp_payoff)./2; 
                  Vmax = (1-
alphabar^Tleftact)*maxc(ftemp_payoff)./(1-alphabar); 
                  retp(Vmax); 
                else;    
 
                  do while r <= min(acts, fbest_response[j]+1); 
                    //temp_acts = round(periods_act); 
                    temp_acts = periods_act; 
                    temp_acts[j]=r; 
 120
                    m=1; 
                    do while m<=subjects; 
                        if m !=j; 
                          if ifsoph[m] ==1; 
                              temp_acts[m]=r; 
                          endif; 
                        endif; 
                        m=m+1; 
                    endo; 
                    //temp_acts = round((1-
alphabar)*temp_acts+alphabar*r); 
                    Vtemp = maxc(ftemp_payoff) + 
alphabar*FVmax(r,temp_acts,alphabar,T,Tleft-
1,fattractions,player,subjects,acts,ave_acts,p,Tleftact-
1,ifsoph); 
  
                     if Vtemp > Vmax; 
                        Vmax = Vtemp; 
                    endif; 
                    r = r+1; 
                  endo; 
                endif; 
      retp(Vmax); 
    endif; 
    //retp(0); 
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endp; 
 
proc findalpha(alp,tlogtable); 
// first column of log table is selflog the second is sophlog 
local ylog, i, size, alpha; 
size = rows(tlogtable); 
ylog = zeros(size,1); 
alpha = exp(alp)/(1+exp(alp)); 
 
i=1; 
do while i <= size; 
    ylog[i] = ln(alpha*exp(tlogtable[i,1])+(1-
alpha)*exp(tlogtable[i,2])); 
 
    i = i+1; 
endo; 
retp(ylog); 
endp; 
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